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Executive Summary  
In its own view, the OSCE should be a primary instrument for managing conflict in 
Europe. It has indeed earned its stripes, especially during the 1990s.  
The first part of the paper departs from defining OSCE conflict management as the 
entirety of activities of the Organization that aims to prevent conflict and consolidate 
peace through eliminating the root causes of tensions both within and between 
states. It defines it as a combination of conflict management activities in a broader 
and in a narrower sense. The two levels of activities need and complement each 
other. Conflict management in a broader sense embraces the full spectrum of the OSCE’s 
comprehensive, multidimensional security building. OSCE conflict management in a 
narrower sense embraces OSCE efforts to forestall aggression and violence by 
addressing the root causes of problems, and to prevent, manage and settle conflicts 
peacefully through appropriate means. These efforts cover the entire conflict cycle.  
The paper describes the key features that – in combination – make OSCE conflict 
management different from the respective activities of other international 
organizations: strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, intervening in 
internal security matters of the participating States, applying the consensus principle 
in decision-making, applying non-coercive efforts only, and achieving pacific 
settlement of disputes under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.  
The paper looks into the OSCE’s period of “rapid institutionalization” between 1992 
and 1995 that produced the Organization’s operational machinery with permanently 
functioning consultation and decision-making bodies, flexible mechanisms and 
procedures, back-office units and implementation structures. It describes to what 
different degrees they have been authorized to deal with managing conflict in the 
broader and narrower senses. It arrives at the finding that since the Istanbul Summit 
in 1999 and the OSCE’s operational peak in 2001, the cutback and depoliticization of 
the Organization have had direct implications for its shrinking capabilities in 
managing conflict, inter alia, for its efforts in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. 
The paper analyses the verbal encouragement for conflict management in the Corfu 
Process in 2009-10 and the “V to V Dialogue” format in 2011. The outcome of the 
2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting is seen as being declaratory for the most 
part with the exception of giving the Secretary General a more prominent function  
in early warning, making the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) an early warning 
focal point and designating a mediation-support focal point within the CPC 
(MC.DEC/3/11). 
It looks into specific conflict management issues that have been or are still under 
discussion. These are mainly controversies over the consensus principle or 
possibilities for applying a pre-positioned consensus, calls for codifying conflict 
management, disputes over the roles of the Chairperson-in-Office and the Secretary 
General, proposals to improve early warning and analytical capacities, 
considerations on how to take preventive action in a timely manner, suggestions on 
further developing confidence-building measures, disputes about post-conflict 
rehabilitation with emphasis on democratization issues and the OSCE’s non-coercive 
peacekeeping activities.  
The guiding thesis of the paper is that the OSCE is solidly equipped for managing 
conflict while years of weakening its political standing and structural capacities, 
combined with the participating States’ reluctance to effectively use the 
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Organization, have created an unfavorable background for OSCE conflict 
management in general and for the Organization’s performance during the events in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010 in particular.  
The second part of the paper analyses the OSCE’s role during the events in Kyrgyzstan 
in 2010. It looks at the pattern of conflict in the country, which is seen in the 
competition between the northern and southern elites combined with inherited inter-
ethnic tensions, especially in areas of compact mixed settlement, increasing Islamic 
extremism, social discontent, bad governance, corruption and criminal business. It is 
argued that none of the events that are discussed in the paper have ceased or 
fundamentally changed the basic configuration of the conflict potential in 
Kyrgyzstan. The paper analyses the Tulip Revolution in February/March 2005 
(change of elites), the public uprising in April 2010 (unexpected reshuffle of elites) 
and the violence in June 2010 (ethnic clashes with complex background). It examines 
the mixed experience the various OSCE institutions and structures have had with the 
various stages of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation.  
The paper comes to the conclusion that (1) the Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship was 
sufficiently equipped by mandate and available mechanisms to take mediating steps 
in the escalating conflict in April 2010. (2) The OSCE made good experience with 
assisting the constitutional process in 2010 and the elections in 2010 and 2011 leading 
to an unprecedented peaceful transfer of power to President Almazbek Atambayev. 
(3) The achievable effectiveness of OSCE non-coercive conflict management efforts is 
open to discussion. The OSCE had a limited scope for pre-emptive OSCE action 
given the Kyrgyz interim government’s lack of authority in June 2010. (4) The modest 
role of the OSCE resulted from the OSCE’s overall declining role in European 
security affairs, its steady depoliticization and the permanent reduction of its on-site 
efforts combined with the lack of collective will of the participating States and the 
Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps. (5) OSCE assistance 
to security sector reforms in Kyrgyzstan strongly relies on national partners, many of 
whom are fundamentally opposed to foreign involvement in internal matters. 
Experiences with the Kyrgyz Police Reform Programme, the Police Advisory Group 
(PAG) and the Community Security Initiative (CSI) are cases in point. (6) The OSCE 
is assisting the fourth Kyrgyz government in a row. It has played a visible role in the 
stabilization of each of these regimes. In times of political change, this is seen 
retroactively as having taken the wrong side. The political backup given to the new 
leadership after the Tulip Revolution had some discrediting effect with President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s quick return to nepotistic, authoritarian governance. The 
OSCE faces the aforesaid dilemma in weak states with weak political players, 
competing elites and hardly assessable potentials for conflict, where consistent 
support to state reforms is imperative but, in the long run, scarcely possible. (7) The 
OSCE’s call to re-establish trust between the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan via 
investigations did not meet with a positive response in many Kyrgyz quarters. It is 
worth thinking about truth and reconciliation processes that could very likely have 
positive results. Beyond this, reconciliation should be achieved predominantly 
through minority participation, a balanced linguistic policy and the like. 
*** 
The paper is based on an extensive analysis of OSCE documents and secondary 
literature as well as a series of interviews with more than thirty interlocutors during 
four research visits to Vienna and Bishkek between September and December 2011. 
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OSCE Conflict Management and the Kyrgyz Experience in 2010 
Advanced Potentials, Lack of Will, Limited Options 
 
In its own view, the OSCE should be a primary instrument for managing conflict in 
Europe. It has, indeed, earned its stripes, especially during the 1990s. However, 
despite this, at the present time, the participating States appear to be unable or 
reluctant to exploit the Organization’s potential in this respect. They are allowing the 
OSCE to lose its political reputation as a significant conflict manager. They are 
allowing it to lose its structural and financial capacities and qualified personnel as 
well. The participating States are again split along the continent’s renewed dividing 
lines. They have disputes over significant and insignificant issues – including a few 
protracted conflicts  – that prevent them from taking substantial decisions and action. 
The international conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and the inter-ethnic violence in 
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 have clearly shown the limited scope for action they are 
giving themselves and the OSCE. The failure of the 2010 Astana Framework for 
Action has also illustrated this. Controversies over conflicts outside the OSCE area 
put additional pressure on the atmosphere within the Organization. The divide over 
the Arab Spring is a case in point. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke at 
the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting in December 2011 of “unlawful purposes and 
attempts at interfering in internal State conflicts” and of “double standards being 
applied in the approaches to different crisis situations”.1
1. Defining OSCE conflict management 
 At the same time, the 
ongoing collapse of the conventional arms control regime in Europe certainly does 
not reduce the likelihood of new rounds of open conflict at local or regional levels. 
The OSCE has a unique range of specialized institutions, mechanisms and 
procedures for conflict management. Over time, detailed norms, principles and 
commitments on diverse elements of conflict management have been adopted by the 
OSCE. At the same time, there is no concise definition of OSCE conflict management 
in OSCE documents. 
For the purpose of this analysis, OSCE conflict management shall be defined as the 
entirety of activities of the Organization that “aim to prevent conflict and consolidate 
peace through eliminating the root causes of tensions, by attaining in particular full 
respect for human rights, including those inscribed in the CSCE provisions on 
national minorities, by building democratic institutions and by fostering economic 
and social progress” both within and between states (Prague Document 1992).2
Furthermore, OSCE conflict management should be understood here as a 
combination of conflict management activities in a broader and in a narrower sense. 
Both levels of activities need and complement each other.  
  
                                                        
1  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Statement by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Eighteenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, 
MC.DEL/14/11, 6 December 2011.  
2  CSCE, Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, Summary of Conclusions, 31 January 1992.  
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1.1. OSCE conflict management in a broader sense 
Conflict management in a broader sense embraces the full spectrum of the OSCE’s 
comprehensive, multidimensional security building. It goes back to the Helsinki 
Final Act (Helsinki 1975) and has been laid down in the Organization’s most 
fundamental documents such as the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris 1990), 
the Helsinki Document on The Challenges of Change (Helsinki 1992), the Common 
and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century 
(Budapest 1994/Lisbon 1996), the Charter for European Security (Istanbul 1999) and 
the Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century 
(Maastricht 2003). It addresses most basic societal, economic, environmental and 
other components of classic inter-state and intra-state conflicts as well as specific new 
transnational threats and challenges that may give rise to insecurity such as bad 
governance, social disparities, demographic maldevelopment, human rights 
violations, illegal migration, mass expulsion, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), 
worsening differences over natural resources, and threats deriving from new 
technologies and techniques. Conflict management in a broader sense builds the 
framework and conceptual foundation for conflict management in a narrower sense 
that addresses concrete examples of dormant, open, protracted or resolved violent 
conflicts.  
1.2. OSCE conflict management in a narrower sense 
OSCE conflict management in a narrower sense embraces OSCE “efforts to forestall 
aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems and to prevent, 
manage and settle conflicts peacefully by appropriate means” (Helsinki 1992).3 These 
efforts cover the entire conflict cycle – a collective terminus that is in vogue in the 
OSCE and currently clearly preferred to conflict management or similar terms. In any 
case, each equally subsumes activities on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation. They require co-operation with 
international organizations of which OSCE participating States are members as an 
essential prerequisite for success (Platform for Co-operative Security, Istanbul 1999).4
The following study will largely be limited to exploring OSCE conflict management 
in a narrower sense.  
  
1.3. Specifics of OSCE conflict management 
There are several features that – in combination – make OSCE conflict management 
different from the respective activities of other international organizations: 
                                                        
3  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision III: Early Warning, Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Management (Including Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions and CSCE 
Peacekeeping), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Helsinki, 10 July 1992.  
4  OSCE, Charter for European Security. Operational Document – The Platform for Co-operative Security, 
January 2000/Corr., Istanbul, 19 November 1999. 
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1. Democracy and human rights. OSCE conflict management is inseparably linked to 
strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, promoting good governance, 
environmental responsibility and sustainable development. It is always 
embedded in a comprehensive value context – the OSCE acquis. It is based on the 
commitments and instruments of all three dimensions of the Organization.  
Deriving from the focus on democracy and human rights, the OSCE sees the 
participating States’ citizens as the ultimate beneficiaries of its efforts. This was 
made clear in Maastricht 2003 where “prime responsibility for providing security 
for their citizens” was formulated as a key element of the OSCE response to new 
threats and challenges.5
2. Interference in internal affairs. While the entire Helsinki Process (1973 – early 1990s) 
was a unique conflict-prevention exercise based on refraining from any 
intervention in the internal affairs of another participating State, contemporary 
OSCE conflict management directly addresses security matters within and 
between the participating States. This element is basic for all activities of the 
value-based OSCE. The well-known Moscow commitment on human dimension 
matters, being of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States, is only 
the most explicit regulation in this regard.
  
6
3. Consensus principle. OSCE conflict management is based on the consensus 
principle as are the Organization’s activities in general. There are only two rather 
weak exceptions. 
 
The “consensus minus one” stipulates “that appropriate action may be taken […], 
if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, 
gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments. Such actions 
would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply outside the 
territory of the State concerned” (Prague Document 1992).7
The “consensus minus two” says that the Organization “may direct any two 
participating States to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute that 
they have not been able to settle within a reasonable period of time and adopted 
provisions related thereto” (Stockholm Document 1992) – a provision of also 
rather vague practicability.
  
8
Activities to address or contribute to the resolution of urgent matters related to 
the human dimension that fall under the Moscow Mechanism (1991) do not 
require the consent of the state concerned as well (see section 2.4 below). 
 
4. Non-coercive efforts only. As an overall concept, peaceful conflict management was 
already foreseen in the Helsinki Final Act 1975. In the Helsinki Decalogue, 
participating States declared they would “settle disputes among them by 
peaceful means”, thereby aiming at “a rapid and equitable solution on the basis 
                                                        
5  OSCE, OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, 
MC.DOC/1/03, Maastricht, 2 December 2003, pt 18. 
6  OSCE, Astana Commemorative Declaration “Towards a Security Community”, SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1, 3 
December 2010. 
7  CSCE, Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, 31 January 1992.  
8  CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council. Decisions: 4. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Stockholm, 14-15 
December 1992. 
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of international law” and using “such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own 
choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to 
which they are parties”.9
At the 1992 Helsinki Summit, they expanded their involvement in conflict 
prevention and crisis management with the option of peacekeeping activities “in 
cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and 
stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution”, whereby these 
“peacekeeping operations will not entail enforcement action”.
  
10
Thus, OSCE conflict management is confined to non-coercive, unarmed efforts. 
The Organization may cover the unarmed components of joint international 
peace enforcement, peacemaking or peacekeeping as it has done on different 
occasions in co-operation with the EU, NATO and the UN as well as Russian-led 
CIS peacekeeping forces. The option of employing own peacekeeping operations 
has so far not been applied by the OSCE.  
 
OSCE conflict management rules out peace enforcement. Many see coercive 
measures as undermining the very character of the Organization – as “just a 
prohibited avenue for a cooperative security organisation”.11
5. Activities under Chapter VIII. For OSCE conflict management, the meaning of the 
Organization’s capacity as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter lies in the collective expression of willingness “to achieve 
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by 
such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council”.
 Some therefore 
even reject the threat or use of sanctions.  
12 Thus, 
generally speaking, it binds the conduct of any OSCE enforcement action to prior 
Security Council authorization.13
                                                        
9  CSCE, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Declaration on Principles Guiding 
Relations between Participating States, pt V (“Peaceful settlement of disputes”), Helsinki, 1 August 1975. 
 Beyond that, there is neither a definition of 
10  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision III, cited above (Note 3).  
11  Victor-Yves Ghébali, The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life, Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), DCAF Policy Paper – No. 10, Geneva, 
November 2005, p. 7. For conceptual clarity, the following distinction between enforcing, making, 
keeping and building peace should be proposed here: Peace enforcement is typically seen as the entirety 
of coercive measures to prevent arising or re-emerging conflict. (Sometimes, a distinction is made 
between peace enforcement and peacemaking by the level of armed force applied in case of a threat to 
peace.) This is while peacekeeping is understood to be the entirety of non-coercive assistance measures 
for creating preconditions for sustainable peace between parties to an armed conflict. It is often 
conducted by international armed forces, police and civilian personnel. Finally, peacebuilding 
typically embraces the entirety of civilian activities in a post-conflict context aiming to create 
sustainable peace through overcoming the structural reasons for violent conflict and eliminating the 
consequences of conflict. This categorization partly follows: Claudia Major et al., Toolbox Crisis 
Management. From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peace-building: Principles, Players, Instruments (Toolbox 
Krisenmanagement. Von ziviler Krisenprävention bis zum Peacebuilding: Prinzipien, Akteure, Instrumente), 
Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) / Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), 
Berlin 2011. 
12  United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, article 52 (2), at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 
13  The UN Charter states that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures 
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regional arrangements and agencies, nor a universal standard for any division of 
labour among them given under Chapter VIII.  
Deriving from the aforementioned features, OSCE conflict management is 
furthermore characterized by the following specifics: 
6. Double capacity of any state party to a conflict. The OSCE’s inclusiveness ensures 
that any participating State that is a party to a conflict also necessarily has a 
third-party capacity. Through consensus-based decision-making, such a state is 
always directly involved in the Organization’s conflict management. With the 
aforementioned minor exceptions, it therefore always has a veto against the 
application of any conflict-related instruments and measures that are addressed 
towards itself. It also has this advantage by contrast to any non-state party to a 
conflict.  
It is worth mentioning that a participating State that has once become part of a 
specific conflict-related activity, say: the OSCE Minsk Group, may remain in this 
capacity practically independent of success or lack of success in the conflict 
resolution process.14
7. Lack of a master plan. OSCE norms, principles and commitments, as well as 
institutions, mechanisms and procedures for conflict management all derive from 
the generic security and co-operation context of the OSCE. It has been rightly 
observed in recent discussions about OSCE conflict management that they “are 
not the result of some grand, well-organized conceptual scheme, but grew out of 
ad hoc responses to fast moving, often unexpected and cataclysmic historical 
events”.
 Some critics point at a certain inflexibility of arrangements 
once agreed upon.  
15
8. Activities east of Vienna only. OSCE conflict management has been conducted only 
in participating States east (or southeast) of Vienna. This geographic imbalance 
and the consequent lack of equality in co-operation have been addressed many 
times in the discussions about OSCE field operations. 
 The problem of resulting organizational inefficiencies has been 
exhaustively discussed over the years.  
                                                                                                                                                        
against any enemy state [...] provided for […] in regional arrangements directed against renewal of 
aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request 
of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression 
by such a state.” United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945,  
article 53 (1), at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 
14  Russia as a regional player in the Caucasus, to take an example, has the double capacity of being 
naturally interested in regional constellations in the South Caucasus and is furthermore directly 
involved in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Not only did it broker the ceasefire in 1994, 
which was, by the way, an operation outside the OSCE context. Through the OSCE Minsk Group it is 
also structurally part of the conflict’s mediation. 
15  William H. Hill, The OSCE and Conflict Management: From Old Themes to New Directions, Keynote 
Presentation for the 2010 Annual Security Review Conference, PC.DEL/477/10, 2 June 2010. 
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2. Establishing and cutting conflict-management structures in 1992-95 
and since 2001 
The outbreak of war in Europe in the 1990s required, first of all, understanding the 
essence of the changed situation. At the Paris Summit in November 1990, 
participating States were still of the opinion that “the threat of conflict in Europe has 
diminished” although they also saw that “other dangers threaten the stability of our 
societies”.16
2.1. Rapid build-up of structures in 1992-95  
  
In 1990, states decided to make the CSCE a continuously operating security 
instrument. Two years later, they decided to strengthen political consultation lines 
and develop instruments of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis 
management that also included frameworks for a negotiated conflict settlement and 
on-site operations such as fact-finding and rapporteur missions as well as 
peacekeeping activities (Helsinki and Prague 1992).17 They made the decision that 
“any participating State may, in order to reduce the risk of conflict, promptly raise an 
issue which in its view has such implications”. (Prague 1992)18 Their positions 
moved forward to a “strategy of active diplomacy” (Stockholm 1992).19
The imperative of conflict management marked the period of “rapid 
institutionalization” of the CSCE through establishing operational headquarters 
between 1992 and 1993 and the dispatch of first field operations in the years up to 
1995.
  
20 Still, in Helsinki 1992, the participating States decided to appoint a High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, use missions and representatives for 
preventive diplomacy, and conduct consultations, negotiations and concerted actions 
for preventing violent conflict.21 In Budapest 1994, they determined that the OSCE 
was to become “a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and 
crisis management in the region”.22
                                                        
16  CSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990.  
 The resulting operational machinery includes 
permanently functioning consultation and decision-making bodies with flexible 
mechanisms and procedures, back-office units and implementation structures.  
17  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision III, cited above (Note 3); 
and: CSCE, Prague Document, cited above (Note 7). 
18  CSCE, Prague Document, cited above (Note 7).  
19  CSCE, Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting: Shaping a New Europe – the Role of the 
CSCE, Stockholm, 14-15 December 1992. 
20  See also: OSCE Secretariat, OSCE Handbook, section “Rapid institutionalization”, Vienna 2007, pp. 7f. 
21  CSCE, Summary of Conclusions of the Stockholm Council Meeting, cited above (Note 19). 
22  CSCE, Budapest Summit Declaration “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era” (Corrected version 
dated 21 December 1994), Budapest, 6 December 1994.  
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2.2. Steady reduction of structures since 2001 
The overall role of the OSCE in European security has been declining since the 
Istanbul Summit in 1999. This decline was not stopped during the brief interim 
period of the Corfu discussions in 2009-10. Since its operational peak in 2001, the 
Organization’s budgets and staff numbers have been continually reduced as well. 
Within the last decade, the Organization’s overall unified budget decreased by 
almost one third in nominal terms.23
2.3. Composition of OSCE conflict management structures  
 The cutback and depoliticization of field 
operations and field-related activities have direct implications for the Organization’s 
shrinking capabilities in managing conflict – both in the broader and the narrower 
senses of the definition. These developments created the unfavourable background 
for the OSCE conflict-management efforts in the 2008 Georgia crisis and the events in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010. 
The most ground-breaking novelty of the pioneering phase in the early 1990s was the 
use of the Organization for collective intervention in the participating States’ internal 
affairs. Lead institutions in this regard became the Chairmanship at the political 
level, the Secretariat with the Conflict Prevention Centre on the managerial and 
advisory fronts, as well as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(Prague 1992) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (Helsinki 1992). 
The newly established OSCE field operations assumed an exceptional role (Berlin 
1991). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as an autonomous body that does not 
operate under the umbrella of the OSCE also positions itself on conflict-related 
matters.  
OSCE Chairmanship 
The Chairmanship has been explicitly authorized to deal with crisis or conflict 
situations (Porto 2002).24 However, in this, the Chairmanship depends, of course, on 
the collective will of the participating States. The guidelines for the Chairmanship’s 
activities give instructions to ensure “that its actions are not inconsistent with 
positions agreed by all the participating States and that the whole spectrum of 
opinions of participating States is taken into account”.25
The Chairmanship is empowered to appoint personal representatives for dealing 
with a crisis or conflict or with other specific issues. Appointments are to be made for 
the duration of the Chairmanship and should have a clear and precise mandate. 
“When appointing a personal representative to deal urgently with a crisis or conflict, 
the Chairmanship-in-Office shall, as time permits, consult with the participating 
  
                                                        
23  The Organization’s unified budget dropped from 209 million Euros in 2001 to about 150 million 
Euros in 2011. See: OSCE Secretary General, Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities, chapter 
“Finance”, and Annex I “The OSCE 2001 Unified Budget”, SEC.DOC/3/01. 26 November 2001, and: 
OSCE, Kazakh Chairmanship welcomes 2011 OSCE budget approval, at: http://www.osce.org/cio/74722. 
24  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No. 8, Role of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office, MC(10).DEC/8, 
Porto, 7 December 2002.  
25  Ibid.  
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States in advance […].”26 In addition, the Chairmanship carries out general 
responsibilities for appointments and assignments. Not least, the Chairmanship 
appoints the heads of field operations. It produces political input through providing 
the participating States with drafts, reports and overviews and recommendations on 
specific issues. The Chairmanship provides the Secretariat, institutions and field 
operations with advice and guidance.27
These regulations, as a whole, give the Chairmanship enough leeway for self-reliant 
initiatives that, of course, also largely depend on the Chairmanship’s own political 
standing and resoluteness.  
  
OSCE Secretariat  
Within the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is mandated to fulfil 
necessary “tasks concerning a procedure for the conciliation of disputes as well as 
broader tasks relating to dispute settlement”.28
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
 It supports the Chairmanship and the 
Secretary General. Its Policy Support Service and Operations Service are the main 
monitoring and analytical units and the central contact points for the field 
operations.  
In its own words, “ODIHR understands and defines itself as a conflict-prevention 
institution, embedded in the OSCE’s comprehensive security concept”.29 Naturally, 
ODIHR efforts in this regard are broad-range and do not reach into conflict 
management in the narrower sense. At the same time, ODIHR states that it “seeks to 
identify, in close co-ordination with the Chairman-in-Office, areas and issues that 
should be brought to the attention of the OSCE community within its focus on 
comprehensive security, early warning, and conflict prevention.”30
“It is more difficult to judge how the ODIHR’s efforts have contributed to preventing 
conflicts and diffusing tensions, as the results of such work often only take effect in the long 
term. Often, success can be gauged in indirect ways only.”
 ODIHR’s general 
democratization assistance provides the framework for respective efforts as it does 
with respect to stabilizing post-conflict situations. At the same time, it often bolsters 
specific conflict-related involvements of other OSCE institutions and structures. This 
is why it is complicated to assess the ODIHR’s contributions to OSCE conflict 
management, as the ODIHR admits itself:  
31
                                                        
26  Ibid.  
  
27  Ibid.  
28  CSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions 
contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990.  
29  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Common Responsibility: Commitments and 
Implementation. Report submitted to the OSCE Ministerial Council in response to MC Decision No. 17/05 on 
Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, Warsaw, 10 November 2006, pt 5, footnote 6. 
30  Ibid., pt 163. 
31  Ibid., pt 155. 
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High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
His mandate authorizes the HCNM to provide “‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, 
‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national 
minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in 
the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a 
conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between 
participating States”. He is empowered to “work in confidence and […] act 
independently of all parties directly involved in the tensions”.32 The High 
Commissioner’s competences in early warning are far-reaching. He becomes active at 
his own discretion, if he “concludes that there is a prima facie risk of potential 
conflict”. He is authorized to issue “an early warning, which will be communicated 
promptly by the Chairman-in-Office […].“33
The HCNM’s mandate for early action has been confined to “recommend[ing] that 
he/she be authorized to enter into further contact and closer consultations with the 
parties concerned with a view to possible solutions”.
 
34 However, in the words of 
former HCNM Rolf Ekéus, “already from the outset the HCNM interpreted the 
mandate in a way that he moved briskly towards ‘early action’”.35
“[N]ational minority issues in situations involving organized acts of terrorism” do 
not fall under his mandate. “The High Commissioner will not communicate with and 
will not acknowledge communications from any person or organization which 
practises or publicly condones terrorism or violence.”
 
36
OSCE field operations 
  
The deployment of an initial Rapporteur Mission to the Republic of Albania in 1991 
produced the prototype for OSCE field operations.37 Decisions were taken to 
establish the first five of these permanently functioning operations in 1992.38 In 1993, 
decisions were taken to establish another four and, in 1994, another five field 
operations.39
                                                        
32  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision II: High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, pts 3 and 4. 
 The deployment of the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 
33  Ibid., pt 13. 
34  Ibid., pt 16. 
35  Rolf Ekéus, Preventive Diplomacy (Muller Lecture), The Hague, 30 January 2003, at: 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/25696. 
36  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document, Helsinki Decision II, cited above (Note 32), pt 25. 
37  CSCE, Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council 19-20 June 1991, Summary of Conclusions, section I., pt 2 and 
Annex 1, Berlin, 19 June 1991. 
38  This process started with the establishment of the Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje, the 
Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Mission to Estonia, and the 
Mission to Georgia in 1992. In the same year, participating States agreed that the CSCE should host 
“an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis” on Nagorno-
Karabakh – the later Minsk Process. On the Minsk Process, see: CSCE, Helsinki Additional Meeting of 
the CSCE Council, Helsinki, 24 March 1992. 
39  In 1993, the Mission to Moldova, the headquarters-based Initial Operation Planning Group (IOPG – 
since 1994 the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) – examining possible peacekeeping actions in the 
context of the Minsk Process), the Mission to Latvia and the Mission to Tajikistan were established; 
and in 1994 the Mission to Tajikistan, the Representative to the Latvian-Russian Joint Commission on 
Military Pensioners, the Mission to Ukraine, the Representative to the Joint Committee on the 
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opened the chapter of large-scale field presences. Their broad mandates went 
significantly beyond the given subjects of dispute or crisis. With the establishment of 
the Assistance Group to Chechnya in 1995, on-site activities stepped on the soil of a 
former Great Power.  
Over the years, operations were established in more than a dozen and a half 
participating States. Today the OSCE’s overall tally shows 16 field operations and 
four field-related operations. (Statistics include 15 operations that were either already 
closed at some point or replaced by successor operations.)40 Their mandates range 
from conflict management in the narrower sense to advocating bilateral agreements 
and providing assistance in lasting transition situations with no direct conflict 
relation.41
With the declining overall role of the Organization, its ongoing depoliticization and 
the steady replacement of politically mandated field operations by service-providing 
presences with rather apolitical mandates, the OSCE faces a new quality of 
difficulties in managing conflict. The trend to close missions, to curb political 
monitoring and background reporting and increasingly hold field operations back 
from interfering in the internal affairs of host countries has been observed since 
about 2001. It ties the Organization’s hands especially in crisis situations. CORE has 
analysed this in detail.
  
42
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) 
  
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has not been tasked per se with conflict 
management. There is no relevant reference in its founding documents – either in the 
1990 Charter of Paris that called for the creation of the Assembly or in its own 
founding paper (CSCE PA Madrid Document 1991) that just generally stipulated that 
the Assembly was to “assess the implementation of the objectives of the CSCE”, 
“discuss subjects addressed during the meetings” of the Ministerial Councils and 
CSCE/OSCE Summits and generally “initiate and promote whatever measures may 
further cooperation and security in Europe”.43 Only in its own Rules of Procedure 
(first adopted in 2000), did the Parliamentary Assembly task itself to “develop and 
promote mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts”.44
                                                                                                                                                        
Skrunda Radar Station and the Representative to the Estonian Expert Commission on Military 
Pensioners. An overview of the mandates and other key parameters of these and all the other OSCE 
field operations has been given in: OSCE Secretariat, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, 
SEC.GAL/183/10, Vienna, 29 October 2010. 
  
40  OSCE Secretariat, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, SEC.GAL/171/11/Corr.1, Vienna, 28 October 2011. 
(The OSCE Office in Zagreb was closed at the end of 2011 after the survey’s release.)  
41  See also: Wolfgang Zellner, Review of Field Missions, in: Daniel Warner (ed.), The OSCE at a Turning 
Point: OSCE Chairmanship and Other Challenges, PSIO Occasional Paper 4/2007, Geneva 2007, pp. 35-
53, here: pp. 36-38. 
42  See: Frank Evers, Appropriate Ways of Developing OSCE Field Activities. CORE Working Paper 22, 
Hamburg, April 2011.  
43  OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, The Madrid Document: Final Resolution Concerning the Establishment of 
the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly agreed at Madrid, 2nd and 3rd April 1991, pt 4. 
44  OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 2 c), 25 March 
2011, at: http://www.oscepa.org/publications/rules-of-procedure. 
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As on other subjects, the Parliamentary Assembly frequently takes a position on 
conflict issues in its periodic declarations, but also issues special resolutions and 
reports on specific countries or matters. It maintains the practice of appointing 
Special Representatives and Special Envoys to regions, countries or conflict areas 
such as Central Asia, the South Caucasus, South-eastern Europe, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Georgia and Afghanistan and the Mediterranean.  
Problems arise mainly when the Parliamentary Assembly touches upon the 
competences of other OSCE structures that lead mediation activities on particular 
conflicts on exclusive behalf of the Organization – typically in agreement with 
international partner organizations and mandated by the 56 OSCE participating 
States. Such cases have happened, e.g., when the Parliamentary Assembly installed 
its own Special Representative on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, a matter that is 
dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Group.45
The picture is complicated by the fact that the Assembly is structurally and 
financially independent from the OSCE. There is a very low level of interaction 
between the two institutions. The rights of the Assembly to participate within the 
OSCE are limited. Nevertheless, the repeated requests made by MPs for the 
expansion of such rights, and ultimately for setting up parliamentary control 
mechanisms over the OSCE run contrary to the structural setting of the OSCE. 
Decision-making and the political positioning of the Parliamentary Assembly follow 
different rules than those of the OSCE. It is not bound to the consensus principle and 
there is also no parity between the states in the distribution of seats. On the other 
hand, the Parliamentary Assembly has clear merits in frankly addressing sensitive 
and partially conflict-related issues such as torture, abuse, extortion, illegal detention 
and other unlawful acts. 
  
2.4. OSCE mechanisms and procedures for handling conflicts and crisis situations 
The OSCE has a sophisticated set of mechanisms and procedures for handling 
conflicts and crisis situations. These are standardized sets of provisions for 
information exchange, discussion and reporting on early warning, conflict 
prevention and crisis management. They regulate the order of procedural steps 
between the participating States. The OSCE Secretariat has catalogued these 
instruments into the four groups of mechanisms and procedures in the human 
dimension, on risk reduction, on early warning and preventive action, and on 
peaceful settlement of disputes based on conciliation and/or arbitration.46
                                                        
45  See: OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Report: A Golden Opportunity – Some Ideas on the Nagorno 
Karabakh Conflict, Presented by Göran Lennmarker, Special Representative on the Nagorno Karabakh 
Conflict, Washington, July 2005. 
 The 
participating States may, at any moment, put these mechanisms and procedures into 
operation – on any issue, development or incident that is of concern to any of them.  
46  An excellent overview has been compiled in: OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Mechanisms 
and Procedures. Summary / Compendium, SEC.GAL/132/11, Vienna 2011.  
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Human dimension mechanisms and procedures 
Human dimension mechanisms and procedures include the Vienna Mechanism 
(1989) that stipulates procedures for exchanging information on questions relating to 
the human dimension and the subsequent Moscow Mechanism (1991) that 
additionally regulates the dispatch of ad hoc missions of independent experts or 
rapporteurs.  
Risk reduction mechanisms and procedures 
Risk reduction mechanisms and procedures are instruments of the politico-military 
dimension. Intended to reduce the risk of arising and/or escalating conflicts of a 
military nature are the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards 
Unusual Military Activities (1999), Co-operation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a 
Military Nature (1999) and Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concern about 
Military Activities (1999), and Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations 
(1993). Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue (2001) is 
meant to improve communication between the OSCE Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC) and the OSCE Permanent Council especially on issues related to 
arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).  
Early warning and preventive action mechanisms and procedures 
Early warning and preventive action mechanisms and procedures go mainly back to 
the Helsinki Document (1992) and stipulate political dialogue between the 
participating States via the various structures and institutions of the OSCE. They 
include ad hoc measures such as establishing fact-finding and rapporteur missions, 
briefing the Chairmanship and Permanent Council on urgent issues etc.47
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Based on Conciliation and/or Arbitration 
  
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Based on Conciliation and/or Arbitration has, at its 
core, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which was established by the 
“Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE” (1992). As is the case 
with several others of the aforementioned mechanisms and procedures, the 
convention has also never been applied and the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
has never been called upon.48
In summarizing the Corfu discussions, the Lithuanian Chairmanship underlined the 
“general agreement that there is no need for additional mechanisms. The key issue 
remains the lack of political will to use them to their full potential rather than the 
inadequacies of the mechanisms per se.”
 Discussions in 2011 revealed that some sides are now 
of the opinion that the potential of the Court of Arbitration and Reconciliation should 
be re-assessed (CIO.GAL/45/11/Corr.1). 
49
                                                        
47  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision III, cited above (Note 3).  
  
48  See also: Patricia Schneider/Tim J. Aristide Müller-Wolf, The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
within the OSCE. Working Methods, Procedures and Composition. CORE Working Paper 16, Hamburg 
2007.  
49  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue”: First Informal Meeting 
at Ambassadors’ Level – The Conflict Cycle, 15 March 2011, Chair’s Perception, CIO.GAL/45/11/Corr.1, 20 
July 2011.  
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3. Verbal encouragement for conflict management in the Corfu 
Process in 2009-10 
Improving OSCE conflict management frequently plays a role in OSCE discussions. 
The recommendations of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons can be seen as an 
emblematic summary of the heated reform discussions in 2005-06. They contain 
generalized statements such as the “OSCE can claim a lead role in addressing issues 
within the four phases of the ‘conflict cycle’ […] affecting any of its States” and 
should give priority to it.50 The Panel suggested improving consultative and 
decision-making processes, enhancing field operations, and strengthening 
operational capacities. Of significance for conflict management in the narrower sense 
was the Panel’s invitation to clarify the roles of the Chairperson-in-Office and the 
Secretary General.51
A similar assessment can be made about the Corfu Process that ended with the 
failure to adopt the Astana Framework for Action, precisely because of the 
participating States’ disagreement over the issue of conflict and conflict management.  
 Beyond that, the reform discussion in 2005-06 had little practical 
impact.  
Conflict management with the sub-topics of best practices, instruments/procedures, 
new mechanisms, national minorities and CSBMs was one of the ten central topics of 
the Corfu dialogue list in 2010.52
a) Strengthening OSCE executive structures for early warning analysis, mediation 
support and quick-response. 
 The Corfu discussions’ outcome was reflected by 
the 2010 Kazakh Chairmanship in the well-known Interim Report (CIO.GAL/117/10) 
that detected four main thematic areas in the delegations’ numerous position papers. 
They may be summarized (slightly shortened) as:  
b) Reviewing, completing and updating OSCE mechanisms and procedures. 
c) Improving the transition from early warning to early action through prior 
authorization of the Chairmanship and OSCE institutions to act in situations 
where this is required. 
d) Enhancing the role of the Permanent Council through improved reporting 
functions of executive structures, and closer co-operation with the FSC.53
The Astana Framework for Action (CIO.GAL/179/10/Rev.5) – which was not adopted 
– indicated that the participating States were at least verbally resolved to enhance 
  
                                                        
50  OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons On Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, Common Purpose. 
Towards a More Effective OSCE: Final Report and Recommendations, 27 June 2005, pts 9 and 15.  
51  Ibid., chapter 3.  
52  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Vienna, 
Indicative List of Topics and Schedule for the informal Corfu meetings at Ambassadorial level in the first half 
of 2010, CIO.GAL/13/10, 3 February 2010. 
53  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Vienna, 
Interim Report Summarizing Proposals Put Forward within the Corfu Process, CIO.GAL/117/10, 2 July 
2010. A concise overview over key proposals submitted by the Delegations under the Corfu Process 
had been given by the Corfu Co-ordinator on the OSCE role in early warning, conflict prevention 
and resolution and post conflict rehabilitation, Amb. Dr. György Molnár, in: Permanent Mission of 
Hungary to the OSCE, Proposals on Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis 
Management and Post-conflict Rehabilitation Submitted by participating States, PC.DEL/248/10, 14 April 
2010. 
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OSCE “capabilities to act effectively across the entire conflict cycle, including 
through reviewing the existing toolbox and considering its possible updating.”54
Apart from a range of mutual encouragement gestures, the list of specific measures 
intended for managing conflict in the narrower sense largely followed the 
aforementioned summary points made by the Kazakh Chairmanship.
  
55
Intended actions to manage conflict in a broader sense that were included in the 
Astana Framework for Action naturally touched on all three OSCE dimensions – 
from improving commitments on military stability, transparency and predictability, 
renewing CSBMs and proceeding with conventional arms control, through 
addressing classic and new economic and environmental threats and challenges to 
stabilizing efforts on human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule 
of law. 
 
4. Examining conflict management under the “V to V Dialogue” 
format in 2011 
In its work programme, the Lithuanian Chairmanship declared conflict-management 
issues as one of its priorities. Under the section “Conflict Cycle” it explained that it 
would focus on the following key points:  
a) Reviewing and possibly updating the existing conflict-management toolbox. 
b) Enhancing the analytical and operational capacity of OSCE structures, 
systematizing the collection and analysis of early warning signals. 
c) Developing the Secretariat’s capacity to support the Chairmanship’s mediation 
efforts. 
d) Examining OSCE post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation.56
Within its “V to V Dialogue” format, the Lithuanian Chairmanship issued invitations 
to a series of expert and informal ambassadorial meetings on these matters, 
supported by a meeting on international responses to challenges posed by natural 
and man-made disasters – a relatively new subject matter for the OSCE.  
  
The “V to V Dialogue” meetings departed from proposals submitted by the 
delegations during the Corfu Process. An overview that somewhat pre-structured the 
debates in 2011 was given by the Lithuanian Chairmanship in a perception paper 
with sections on early warning, crisis response, protracted conflicts, post-conflict 
rehabilitation, mediation capacity, review of the existing mechanisms, co-operation 
with other international actors, and resources.57
                                                        
54  OSCE, Astana Framework for Action “Shared Priorities and Objectives”, CIO.GAL/179/10/Rev.5, 30 
November 2010. 
  
55  Ibid. 
56  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, 2011 Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship 
Work Programme, CIO.GAL/4/11/Rev.1, 12 January 2011. 
57  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue”: First Informal 
Meeting, cited above (Note 49). 
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The Chairmanship’s clear intention was to depoliticize discussions and concentrate 
on suggestions that promised good chances for consensus and deliverables. 
Realistically, the intention was neither to expand OSCE efforts into new fields nor to 
modify the mandates of existing OSCE structures and institutions.58 The focus was 
rather optimizing OSCE efforts on the basis of existing mandates. With respect to 
protracted conflicts, the Chairmanship expressed the modest, but realistic goal: “to 
progress the resolution of existing conflicts”.59
In the course of the “V to V Dialogue”, debates about increasing OSCE conflict-
management capacities through more standardized procedures and expanded 
competencies of the Chairmanship or the Secretary General seemed to distract 
attention from more substantial issues. In some observers’ comments, discussions 
between a number of Western participating States and Russia again dealt with 
discrepancies and contradictions on less important issues.  
  
After the failure of the Astana Framework for Action, a substantial decision on OSCE 
conflict management was expected at the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting 2011. 
The Vilnius Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (MC.DEC/3/11) contains a 
dozen and a half provisions in this respect that, for the most part, however, are of 
appellatory character. Nevertheless, substantial decisions were taken as well, in 
particular on giving the Secretary General a more prominent function in early 
warning, making the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) an early warning focal point 
and designating a mediation-support focal point within the CPC (see below and 
annex).60
5. Specific conflict management issues under discussion 
 
Some particular points made on OSCE conflict management up to and within the 
Corfu Process and the “V to V Dialogue” should be highlighted somewhat more 
closely here.  
Consensus principle or pre-positioned consensus 
Apparently, a most sensitive part in the Corfu Process involved fears about possibly 
deviating from the consensus principle when mandating the Chairmanship and 
executive structures to take responsibility in crisis situations. In this context, a so-
called pre-positioned consensus was discussed – the Chairmanship’s prior 
authorization to act.61
                                                        
58  Ibid. See also: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, Opening Remarks for 
Ambassador Renatas Norkus, Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Expert Meeting within the Framework 
of the Conflict Cycle – V to V Dialogue: „Strengthening the Mediation Support Capacity within the OSCE“, 
CIO.GAL/142/11/Corr.1, 20 July 2011. 
 A respective proposal on a quick crisis reaction procedure that 
59  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue”: First Informal 
Meeting, cited above (Note 49). 
60  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s 
Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict 
Rehabilitation, MC.DEC/3/11, Vilnius, 7 December 2011.  
61  See also: OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Draft Statement by Ambassador Herbert Salber, Director of 
the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, on “Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management in the OSCE Area” at 
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would give permission to the Chairmanship “to respond swiftly in the event of 
escalating tensions or conflict in the OSCE area, through the deployment of small 
teams” and necessitate the Permanent Council’s involvement only afterwards was, 
for example, put forth by the US Delegation.62
Remarkably, it was Russia that had, a decade earlier, also proposed giving the 
Chairperson-in-Office special authorization, stating that “[i]n resolving issues related 
to crisis or conflict, the Chairman-in-Office, on the decision of the Permanent Council 
or, if it is an urgent matter, at his own discretion, appoints personal representatives 
or envoys with a clear and specific mandate to ensure support in the search for the 
settlement of crisis or conflict”.
  
63
At the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting in 2011, the participating States made no 
decision on the issue, but invited each other to consider the deployment of expert 
teams and other forms of temporary presence on the ground in the context of fact-
finding in emerging crises and conflicts and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts. They 
tasked the Secretary General with preparing a proposal on enhancing OSCE fact-
finding in emerging crises and conflicts (see annex).
 
64
Codifying conflict management 
  
By contrast to the initiatives mentioned above to ease early crisis interventions, 
Russia, in 2010, proposed codifying OSCE activities in conflict prevention and crisis 
management by adopting guiding principles. The Russian proposal emphasized 
particularly the consensus principle at all stages of conflict prevention and crisis 
management and with respect to any measure, requiring the “prior consent and 
active support of all parties involved in a particular crisis situation”.65
Clarifying the roles of the Chairperson-in-Office and Secretary General 
  
The relationship between the OSCE Chairmanship and the Secretary General is of 
particular relevance in crisis situations as it is, indeed, for the Organization’s general 
performance. Potentially, the Secretary General could play a more prominent 
political role than he currently does. This point has been made repeatedly by various 
delegations. As a representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, the Secretary General 
is, by his mandate, entitled to “make public statements on behalf of the Organization 
as a whole” and to support “the process of political dialogue and negotiations among 
participating States”.66
                                                                                                                                                        
the 42nd Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Permanent Council, Vienna, 10 March 
2010, SEC.GAL/46/10, 8 March 2010.  
 Considering these provisions, the Chairperson-in-Office 
62  United States Mission to the OSCE, Food-for-Thought on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management in 
the OSCE Area, PC.DEL/93/10, 19 February 2010. 
63  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Non-Paper: OSCE Chairman-in-Office, PC.DEL/932/01, 
16 November 2001. 
64  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, cited above (Note 60), pts 4 and 11. 
65  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE and the Delegation of the Russian 
Federation on Military Security and Arms Control, Proposal for a Draft Decision on Conflict Prevention 
and Crisis Management in the OSCE Area, FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1, 19 January 2010. 
66  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No. 15/04, Role of the OSCE Secretary General, MC.DEC/15/04, Sofia, 
7 December 2004.  
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could utilize the Secretary General for more than merely providing administrative 
assistance.  
As mentioned above, the Panel of Eminent Persons had argued that the “role of the 
Chairman-in-Office should be to lead the political, rather than the operational 
activities”, while it also suggested that it would enable the Secretary General to 
“[t]ake the lead on OSCE’s operational engagement in crisis situations”.67 However, 
in the course of OSCE reform discussions in 2005-06, the participating States clearly 
opted for limiting the Secretary General to a supporting role (Brussels 2006).68
Even so, the matter is still being discussed. A notion in this direction was presented 
once again by the Lithuanian Chairmanship 2011 who proposed in the “V to V 
Dialogue” “strengthen[ing] the explicit role of the Secretary General, supported by 
the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, to provide early warning to 
participating States”.
  
69
As previously noted, the Secretary General was actually tasked at the Vilnius 
Ministerial Council meeting with providing early warning to the participating States 
on any situation of emerging tensions or conflicts in the OSCE area and suggesting 
respective measures of response (see annex).
 
70
Improving early warning capacities 
 This decision may gain greatest 
significance in specific crisis situations.  
In the Maastricht Strategy (2003), participating States decided to adjust the 
Organization’s structures to new tasks in managing conflict:  
“More attention should be paid to the early warning functions in the Secretariat, 
institutions and field operations, and follow-up to early warning should be strengthened.”71
Improving the OSCE’s capacities in early warning was also one of the points of the 
Corfu Process and the “V to V Dialogue”. Since the early 1990s, the OSCE has 
elaborated a detailed mechanism and practice for early warning and preventive 
action in “situations within the CSCE area which have the potential to develop into 
crises”.
 
72
Collective opinion within the “V to V Dialogue” was that the OSCE has the essential 
early warning mechanisms and capacities within headquarters and in the field. Key 
responsibility lies with the Chairperson-in-Office. The HCNM is mandated to 
“provide ‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible 
stage with respect to tensions involving national minority issues”.
  
73
                                                        
67  OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, Common Purpose, cited above (Note 50), pts 36 and 37.  
 ODIHR sees its 
68  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No. 18/06, Further Strengthening the Effectiveness of OSCE Executive 
Structures, MC.DEC/18/06, Brussels, 5 December 2006.  
69  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue” on the Conflict Cycle: 
1st Expert Meeting on “Enhancing the Early Warning and Analytical Capacity of the OSCE”, 15 April 2011, 
Chair’s Perception, CIO.GAL/81/11/Corr.1, 20 July 2011. 
70  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, cited above (Note 60), pt 4.  
71  OSCE, OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability, cited above (Note 5), pt 27. 
72  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision III, cited above (Note 3), 
pt 3. 
73  CSCE, CSCE Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Decision II, cited above (Note 32). 
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monitoring tasks in the human dimension as an essential element of OSCE early 
warning.74 Through observing media developments, the OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media carries out an early warning function as well.75
Delegations stated that the Organization would benefit from more co-ordination 
among these structures and improved analysis capacities for processing early 
warning signals. Proposals made under the “V to V Dialogue” aimed at co-
ordinating the gathering and analysing of information and co-operating with 
international partner organizations. These considerations resulted in proposals to 
elaborate a comprehensive concept on an OSCE early warning capacity within a 
special ad hoc working group.
 The Secretariat 
with the CPC, along with the field operations, plays a central role in gathering and 
processing information.  
76
The key point with OSCE early warning activities is its political sensitivity. Certainly, 
a difference must be made between internal early warning within the Organization 
and issuing official early warning statements to the OSCE community. While internal 
action requires expert know-how and managerial leadership, official early warning 
announcements are highly sensitive politically as is the translation of early warning 
into early action. They touch upon conflicting interests, may trigger unintended 
developments and can even aggravate given situations. Previous HCNM Rolf Ekéus 
pointed to the problem that “[t]here is no foolproof system of identifying the factors 
that may trigger conflict”.
  
77 His successor Knut Vollebaek recently underlined “the 
essential element of political will, without which even the best early warning 
mechanism becomes an academic exercise”.78
Apart from the increased role of the Secretary General in early warning, outlined at 
the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting, organizational arrangements made there 
also include making the CPC the focal point for the collection, collation, analysis and 
assessment of early warning signals (see annex).
 Observers therefore ask what the 
political added value would be if the OSCE were to establish enhanced early warning 
capacities. 
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Increasing analytical capacities 
 
With a particular view to early warning, the 2011 Lithuanian Chairmanship 
perceived deficits in inadequate human and financial resources, insufficient 
systematic data collection, a lack of analysis methodology, underdeveloped 
institutional linkages with other international actors and the Organization’s 
distraction from core tasks by project-based activities. It proposed developing an 
early warning methodology and increasing the capacities of the CPC for appropriate 
                                                        
74  OSCE ODIHR, Common Responsibility, cited above (Note 29), pts 163 and 212. 
75  OSCE, Mandate of the OSCE, Representation on Freedom of the Media, PC.DEC No. 193, 5 November 
1997. 
76  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue” on the Conflict Cycle: 
1st Expert Meeting, cited above (Note 69). 
77  Rolf Ekéus, Preventive Diplomacy, cited above (Note 35). 
78  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to the 
868th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, HCNM.GAL/1/11/Rev.1, 15 June 2011.  
79  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, citied above (Note 60), pts 2 and 4.  
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early warning analysis.80 A group of EU member states argued along the same lines. 
Suggestions were made to create a CPC-coordinated framework for the collection, 
collation and analysis of early warning signals and their translation into early action 
and to use the expertise of former OSCE representatives or the input of research 
institutions.81
Arguments in this direction may be misleading. Full-fledged political analysis would 
necessarily entail financial means and manpower and go far beyond the OSCE’s 
capacities. It would require the systematic deployment of know-how and resources 
of specialized organizations and a “permanent division of labour” with them the 
participating States explicitly neglected in Istanbul 1999.
  
82
Besides, it remains to be seen to what extent the CPC will be enabled to provide 
comprehensive analysis in its new capacity as the OSCE early warning focal point as 
decided in Vilnius in 2011.
  
83
Taking timely preventive action 
 
Translating early warning into early action is another point under discussion. From 
the CPC’s perspective, the Organization has not always succeeded in taking 
preventive action in a timely manner on the eve and in the very early stages of an 
impending crisis. These deficits are not caused by a lack of resources or tools. “We 
invest lots of energy and time on informal and formal diplomacy rather than 
activating the preventive instruments we have, such as fact-finding and observer 
missions, preventive diplomacy, perhaps by means of a small mediation team, or 
appropriate confidence-building measures”, comments former CPC Director Herbert 
Salber underlining again the necessary “mobilization of political will to act 
rapidly”.84
The Kazakh Chairmanship noted the general view of the Delegations that “the OSCE 
need[ed] to regain its strategic vision in conflict prevention” and that it should become 
a “‘first responder’ to crisis and conflict situations” and a “primary initiator of 
international co-operation” that acts throughout the entire OSCE area.
  
85
                                                        
80  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, “V to V Dialogue” on the Conflict Cycle: 
1st Expert Meeting, cited above (Note 69). 
 
81  Delegations of Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden to the OSCE, Strengthening of the OSCE capacities in the field of early 
warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, Food-for-
thought paper developed in the framework of the Corfu Process, PC.DEL/90/10/Corr.1, 26 April 2010. 
82  OSCE, Charter for European Security, chapter III., Our Common Response,  section on Co-operation with 
Other International Organizations: The Platform for Co-operative Security, January 2000/Corr., Istanbul, 
November 1999. 
83  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, cited above (Note 60), pt 2. 
84  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Speaking Points for Ambassador Herbert Salber, Director, Conflict 
Prevention Centre, Informal Ambassadorial Meeting on 15 March 2011, “Advancing the ‘V to V’ Dialogue on 
the Conflict Cycle”, SEC.GAL/48/11/Corr.1, 30 August 2011. 
85  Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Vienna, The 
Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Management and Post-
Conflict Rehabilitation, Food-for-Thought, CIO.GAL/22/10, 18 February 2010. 
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Developing confidence-building measures 
The participating States are considering developing confidence-building measures 
(CBMs). CBMs, in the OSCE context, are “measures with a broader focus on building 
confidence in the political, economic, environmental and/or human realms among 
people within a State and/or between States [… and] as: 1) tools to lower tensions 
and make it less likely that a conflict would break out through a lack of information, 
misunderstanding, mistake or misreading of the actions of a potential adversary; 
and/or 2) a means to foster trust and bridge dividing lines between potential 
antagonists as an essential element of building sustainable peace. […] CBMs can play 
a significant role in conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation and 
reconciliation.”86 CBMs are relevant measures throughout the entire conflict cycle.”87
In the course of the “V to V Dialogue”, participating States talked about matters such 
as confidence building through democratization efforts in the political sphere, cross-
border and inter-community activities in the economic sphere, encouraging joint 
responses to natural disasters and man-made disasters in the environmental sphere, 
co-operation with traditional community authorities in the cultural sphere or people-
to-people activities in the societal sphere.
  
88 In Vilnius, participating States merely 
encouraged each other to make greater use of CBMs and CSBMs.89
Post-conflict rehabilitation with emphasis on democratization 
 
In its current understanding, the OSCE perceives post-conflict rehabilitation as the 
entirety of efforts in three main directions – stabilization, reconstruction and 
peacebuilding in the aftermath of a conflict or crisis.90 Post-conflict rehabilitation in 
the OSCE context predominantly means aiming at preventing a relapse into conflict 
or crisis through providing political assistance in areas such as societal reconciliation, 
economic recovery, state reconstruction and democratic transformation. From the 
standpoint of most participating States, the crux of post-conflict rehabilitation lies in 
establishing democratic foundations of recovering market economies and states 
based on the rule of law. (It is the most polarizing point as well, as is commonly 
known.) Respect and protection of human and minority rights play a special role. 
These efforts are bolstered by selected capacity-building activities while fundamental 
humanitarian aid or the physical reconstruction of infrastructure is usually left to 
partners such as international development organizations and specialized national 
agencies.91
                                                        
86  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Strengthening Local Ownership of Non-Military Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs). Food-for-Thought Paper, SEC.GAL/78/11, 28 April 2011. 
  
87  Non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs) are to be distinguished from confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) “which are more narrowly geared towards building confidence 
primarily in the military arena”; ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Vilnius, 7 December 2011, cited 
above (Note 60.  
90  See also: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, OSCE Chairmanship Workshop 
on Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: Stabilization, Reconstruction and Peace-building, Vienna, 2 and 3 May 2011, 
Final Report, CIO.GAL/141/11, 12 July 2011. 
91  For an overview see: OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Background Brief, OSCE Activities and 
Advantages in the Field of Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, SEC.GAL/76/11, 28 April 2011. 
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Non-coercive peacekeeping or a role in peacekeeping 
In Prague in 1992, the participating States cautiously formulated “giv[ing] careful 
consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in 
peacekeeping”.92 In Budapest 1994, they were positive about “using, inter alia, CSCE 
peacekeeping operations and missions”.93 With respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict they went so far as to declare “their political will to provide, with an 
appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council, a multinational 
CSCE peacekeeping force following agreement among the parties for cessation of the 
armed conflict.”94 The Minsk Group Troika, the Personal Representative of the 
Chairperson-in-Office and the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) were tasked in 
1995 with designing this peacekeeping force.95 Until the Georgian-Russian war in 
2008, the OSCE co-operated within the framework of the UN-led conflict settlement 
process on Abkhazia and the Joint Control Commission and the Joint Peacekeeping 
Force in South Ossetia where it had a “monitoring role concerning the joint 
peacekeeping forces”.96
In Istanbul 1999, the participating States decided to “explore options for a potentially 
greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping”.
 OSCE field operations have complemented and supported 
the peacekeeping efforts of other international organizations in the Balkans as well.  
97 During OSCE reform 
discussions, the matter was on the agenda again. The OSCE CPC made the point that 
peace operations have become “increasingly complex, involving military, police and 
civilian personnel addressing a wider range of tasks and responsibilities” and that 
“[t]his has dramatically broadened the very definition of peacekeeping and 
profoundly changed its nature”.98 At the Porto Ministerial Council meeting in 2002, 
the participating States decided “to conduct a review of peacekeeping, with a view 
towards assessing OSCE capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations and 
identifying options for potential OSCE involvement in peacekeeping in the OSCE 
region, to be completed by the end of 2003”.99
                                                        
92  CSCE, Prague Document, cited above (Note 7).  
 In Maastricht 2003, they reiterated that 
“[o]n a case-by-case basis and to help maintain peace and stability, the OSCE can 
93  CSCE, Budapest Summit Declaration, cited above (Note 22).  
94  CSCE, Budapest Summit Decisions, II. Regional Issues. Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Budapest, 6 December 1994.  
95  See: Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship, Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno 
Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE ("Minsk Conference") adopted by the Chairman-in-Office, DOC. 
525/95, Vienna, 23 March 1995; OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Survey of OSCE Field 
Operations, High-Level Planning Group, section 2, Tasks, SEC.GAL/171/11, Vienna, 28 October 2011; 
and: Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk 
Conference, section 2, Tasks, ibid.  
96  OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, The OSCE Mission to 
Georgia, section 2, Tasks, SEC.GAL/171/11, Vienna, 28 October 2011.  
97  OSCE, Charter for European Security, chapter IV., Our Common Instruments, section on Peacekeeping, 
January 2000/Corr., Istanbul, January 2000/Corr., 19 November 1999, pt 46. 
98  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Comparative Analysis of Crisis Response Capabilities – The OSCE 
Position, Background paper for distribution/discussion (1st Draft), Vienna, June 2004. 
99  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No. 4, Reviewing the OSCE Role in the Field of Peacekeeping 
Operations, MC(10).DEC/4, Porto, 7 December 2002.  
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decide to play […] a role in peacekeeping, which constitutes an important 
operational element of the overall capability of the Organization”.100
Collective considerations in 2011 remained within the boundaries of civilian 
peacebuilding. The Lithuanian Chairmanship spoke in the post-conflict context of the 
need “to take stock of the OSCE’s civilian capability to respond coherently, rapidly 
and effectively as an international contributor to building comprehensive and 
sustainable peace in the aftermath of conflict”.
 
101
6. The Kyrgyz events in 2005 and 2010 
 
While the OSCE was fully engaged in the Corfu Process in 2009-10 and unable to 
reach consensus over any matter, open conflict broke out again in its participating 
State Kyrgyzstan.  
6.1. Pattern of conflict in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan has experienced at least four major violent events within the last two 
decades that left a strong imprint on its political system and climate. With Moscow’s 
waning control over Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan had turned into an unstable entity. 
Many have viewed Kyrgyzstan as a failing state since its very independence. The 
first ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan broke out in the southern districts around Osh and 
Uzgen in June 1990 – with casualties among ethnic Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks. These set 
the stage for future inter-ethnic relations in an independent Kyrgyzstan. The Tulip 
Revolution in 2005 and the public uprising in April 2010 were followed by inter-
ethnic violence in June 2010. The HCNM gives an additional account of various other 
ethnic incidents in 2006, 2009 and 2010 – partly long before the violence in June 
2010.102
The north-south divide is one of the characteristics of Kyrgyzstan’s societal, 
commercial and political life. Discussions about the northern elites’ access to 
southern resources and vice versa are a major element in the country’s domestic 
politics.  
  
Along these lines, the political process in Kyrgyzstan has been characterized over the 
last two decades by an alternating rule over the country by northern and southern 
clans or elites. President Askar Akayev, as the representative of the North, was 
forcefully overthrown by the southerner, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, during the Tulip 
Revolution in 2005. The northern Interim President Roza Otunbayeva replaced the 
latter after the violent events in April 2010. President Almazbek Atambayev 
                                                        
100  OSCE, OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability, cited above (Note 5), pt 26. 
101 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE, OSCE Chairmanship Workshop on Post-
Conflict Rehabilitation: Stabilization, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding. Concept Note, CIO.GAL/14/11, 9 
February 2011. 
102  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to the 
808th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, HCNM.GAL/2/10, 4 May 2010. 
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consolidated the northern camp’s rule after a remarkably peaceful transfer of power 
through the constitutional process in 2010 and the elections on 30 October 2011.  
The political and commercial competition between the northern and southern elites 
in the capital Bishkek and the country’s provinces is part of the background of the 
events in 2005 and 2010. It was nourished as well by inherited inter-ethnic tensions 
especially in areas of compact mixed settlement, by increasing Islamic extremism, 
social discontent, bad governance, corruption and criminal business.  
None of the events that will be discussed in the following have ceased or 
fundamentally changed the basic configuration of the conflict potential in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
6.2. The Tulip Revolution in 2005: Change of elites 
The Tulip Revolution in February/March 2005 represents the prehistory to the events 
of 2010. The starting point was protests in western and southern districts of the 
country over manipulations during the parliamentary elections on 27 February 2005. 
An international context was seen by many in the preceding Georgian Rose 
Revolution and Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004. Although moderate by 
regional standards, Askar Akayev’s regime had become corrupt and oppressive.  
The Tulip Revolution saw some violence especially in the southern city of Jalal-Abad 
with a number of casualties. The political benefits of the Tulip Revolution were 
questionable. Critics say it was a mistake by the international community to have 
quickly changed their support in favour of the Bakiyev regime. The replacement of 
Askar Akayev by Kurmanbek Bakiyev was a replacement of the northern by the 
southern elites’ rule with no change of the country’s political and economic system. 
Thus, the designation “revolution” is misleading. 
6.3. The public uprising in April 2010: Unexpected reshuffle of elites 
The events of 6-7 April 2010 took everybody by surprise. The quick acceleration of 
spontaneous events and the rapid turn of public opinion against the incumbent 
president Kurmanbek Bakiyev were hardly predictable, obviously not even to the 
group that installed Roza Otunbayeva as interim president. It resulted in mass 
protests in Bishkek and the death of more than 80 persons who were killed after 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev had ordered his troops to open fire against protesters in front of 
the building of the presidential administration.  
This rather spontaneous overthrow caused “a power vacuum and consequent 
political rivalries, fragile state institutions and the weak rule of law in southern 
Kyrgyzstan boosting ethno-nationalism”, as an Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry (also: Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission – KIC) stated.103
                                                        
103  Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), KIC final report published, Bishkek, 3 May 2011, at: 
http://www.k-ic.org/en/news/364-kic-final-report-published.html. 
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Plundering of shopping malls and markets in the streets of Bishkek were emblematic 
of the unstable situation throughout the entire country. 
The events in 2005 and April 2010 can be seen as following similar patterns. The 
overthrown presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev had both initially 
come to power based on a consensus between the elites of the northern and the 
southern parts of the country. Both presidents were elected to serve coalition 
governments. Both of their regimes were characterized by bad governance, 
corruption and weak political leadership. Both regimes were largely based on 
leading personalities rather than on the political and administrative system of the 
country. Over the time, both family clans increasingly ruled over the businesses of 
competing clans. Both regimes did little to contribute to political consolidation, 
economic development and social well-being. In 2005 and in 2010, poor leadership 
coincided with the instability of the system. The political groupings around the two 
presidents were very vulnerable – not least to external blows. Observers point to the 
Russian anti-Bakiyev campaign in early 2010 that preceded the April events.  
The common trigger point for both the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and the public 
uprising in April 2010 was disappointment about unpopular authoritarian, but weak 
regimes, bad governance and social hardship.  
6.4. Violence in June 2010: Ethnic clashes with complex background 
The violent events in June 2010 are labelled differently – from genocide to pogrom, 
ethnic conflict, instigated provocation of external forces and Islamic extremists, to 
putsch or conspiracy of business circles or criminals. Some observers call it the 
revenge of Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s supporters after the loss of power in April 2010 and 
the launch of another attempt to re-change the order. “They just exploited the 
weakest link in Kyrgyzstan’s public affairs – inter-ethnic relations”, they comment.  
The KIC came to the conclusion “that the violence of June does not qualify as either 
war crimes or genocide”. At the same time it detected “acts [that] would amount to 
crimes against humanity […] against an identifiable group on ethnic grounds” and 
“many other criminal acts committed in both Osh and Jalalabad during the events 
that fall under the Criminal Code of Kyrgyzstan”. It also stated that it “found that 
there have been and still are serious violations of international human rights law 
committed by the State in the aftermath of the events”.104
The roots of the violence can be traced directly back to the change of power in April 
2010 and the open confrontation between the northern and southern elites. This was 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry or Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (KIC) under 
Kimmo Kiljunen (OSCE PA’s Special Representative for Central Asia) had been established at the 
request of Interim President Roza Otunbayeva. It is quoted here in view of the fact that its report 
triggered the most detailed governmental comments, more detailed than those on any other inquiry 
report. This was despite the fact that the commission was, by its status, not tied to any international 
organization or institution. Neither the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly nor any other organization 
had taken a decision supporting the commission. 
104  Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (KIC), Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into 
the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, at: http://www.k-
ic.org/images/stories/kic_report_english_final.pdf. 
CORE Working Paper 24 | 31 
added to by factors such as the weakness of the interim government and the growing 
political claims of Uzbek minority representatives.  
The violence was predictable. It again involved clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz individuals mainly in the southern districts in and around the cities of Osh 
and Jalal-Abad. “There was a common sense that something would happen”, 
witnesses state in retrospect. There was public rhetoric about unwanted or avertable 
warfare long before the actual events. The KIC concluded that  
“[t]he events must be viewed in the context of the historical and political background of the 
region, particularly the relationship between the communities of ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic 
Uzbeks. In this regard the KIC notes the under-representation of ethnic Uzbeks in public life 
and the rising force of ethno-nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan. The KIC notes 
further the power vacuum and consequent political rivalries, fragile state institutions and 
the weak rule of law in southern Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the 7 April overthrow of the 
Bakiyev government. 
The events resulted in significant loss of life and injury, of which the majority of victims 
were ethnic Uzbeks. In total about 470 people died. […] About 1,900 people received 
medical assistance at hospitals. […] About 111,000 people were displaced to Uzbekistan and 
a further 300,000 were internally displaced. There was also significant property damage, 
again to a disproportionately high number of ethnic Uzbek-owned properties. In total about 
2,800 properties were damaged […] ethnic Kyrgyz also suffered very significant losses, in 
terms of life, health and property. […] both communities suffered loss.”105
The Commission established that of the people killed 74 % were Uzbek and 25 % 
Kyrgyz.
  
106
7. Experience with OSCE conflict management in Kyrgyzstan 
 As a consequence of the June violence, the country’s southern districts 
were largely taken out of the central government’s control if they had, in fact, ever 
been subordinated to Interim President Roza Otunbayeva. Since June 2010, NGO 
activists have observed a gradual reposition of property back into the hands of 
northern elites.  
The following section looks into the OSCE’s involvement at the various stages of 
early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation 
in Kyrgyzstan in April and June 2010. It reflects on the structures and procedures, 
which the OSCE has for managing conflict. It points out difficulties deriving from the 
OSCE’s weakened standing and capacities. It shows the substantial limitations the 
Organization faces should the participating States not be willing to take action. It 
points out the problems that occur when the OSCE supports rival elites. It also 
departs from the finding that, unlike in other states where there has been conflict and 
the OSCE has been largely seen as a leading international actor, the Organization 
obviously did not have such a prominent place in the awareness of the general public 
and the government in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, the OSCE is seen as a solid 
partner and a good transmission vehicle for other organizations’ opinions and 
efforts.  
                                                        
105  Ibid. 
106  Ibid. 
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In managing crisis situations in Kyrgyzstan, the Kazakh Chairmanship, to some 
extent, took a significant lead within the international community, inter alia, through 
the Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Zhanybek Karibzhanov. A 
prominent role was played by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek that has – in contrast to 
other OSCE field presences in the region – a clear political mandate. It explicitly 
emphasizes commitments in the area of conflict management.107
7.1. OSCE early warning activities in Kyrgyzstan 
 Along with the 
Centre in Bishkek, the HCNM, ODIHR and the OSCE Academy in Bishkek fulfil 
significant functions in managing conflict in the broader sense.  
On the broader scale, participating States and the OSCE Secretariat were continually 
briefed on the Kyrgyz developments through the regular reporting of the OSCE 
Centre in Bishkek and the HCNM. However, issuing an early warning on the events 
in April was almost impossible. As stated above, events occurred unexpectedly and 
developed rapidly. “It was not organized or pre-meditated”, reports the OSCE 
Centre in Bishkek.108
Concerning the violence in June, an official early warning was issued by the HCNM 
only days after the event’s outbreak.
 
109 On the other hand, the HCNM had, in the 
period before that, repeatedly warned about developments in Kyrgyzstan. On 4 May, 
in a general statement (not categorized as an early warning), he had explicitly 
warned that “[i]nter-ethnic tension is increasing between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
communities in the south of the country” and that the April “uprising in Kyrgyzstan 
has resulted in an increase in nationalism, which has the potential to threaten inter-
ethnic peace in the country”.110 The overall picture given in this report was 
devastating. The HCNM called it “the OSCE’s biggest challenge since the 2008 war in 
the Caucasus”.111
The OSCE Centre in Bishkek made its own observations and used its partnership 
monitoring networks for submitting an unusually high number of periodic spot 
reports, as its representatives note. This was supplemented by signals from other 
international and national reporting channels and the media.  
  
Thus, the participating States could have been aware ahead of time of the increasing 
likeliness of the violence that occurred in June. Nevertheless, they were reluctant or 
unable to use the OSCE or other instruments to take greater steps in that country. 
                                                        
107  The first bullet point of the mandate of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek states: “Given the OSCE role as 
primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation, promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as the co-
operation of the Kyrgyz Republic within the OSCE framework, with special emphasis on the 
regional context, in all OSCE dimensions, including the economic, environmental, human and 
political aspects of security and stability”. OSCE, Decision No. 245, PC.DEC/245, 23 July 1998. 
108  OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Report to the Permanent Council by the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, 
Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere, 27 May 2010, PC.FR/7/10/Rev.1, 25 May 2010.  
109  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Early 
warning to the (special) Permanent Council on 14 June 2010, Vienna, 14 June 2010.  
110  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, 4 May 2010, cited above (Note 102).  
111 Ibid.  
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Apart from this, some observers underscore the specific bilateral interests the Kazakh 
Chairmanship had in Kyrgyz affairs. Some believe that this somewhat shaped the 
way incoming reports were edited within the Secretariat and especially on the side of 
the Chairmanship. Some speak of a rather self-controlled or neutralized proofreading 
process, which is certainly a sensitive issue in any case, to say nothing of issuing 
official early warnings.  
7.2. OSCE conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan 
OSCE conflict prevention in the broader sense is largely provided by the OSCE 
Centre in Bishkek, the HCNM, ODIHR and the OSCE Academy.  
The OSCE Centre’s activities embrace economic and environmental efforts, human 
dimension activities, media development, co-operation with the OSCE Academy in 
Bishkek, policing, customs services and politico-military activities. The Centre has set 
strategic priorities in the areas of border security and management, rule of law, good 
governance, legislation, environmental protection, and regional co-operation.112 It 
has the advantage of maintaining long-established ties with all significant 
governmental and non-governmental players in the country. The Centre works 
through informal mediatory efforts and facilitates dialogue.113
The High Commissioner emphasizes that, with respect to his efforts in Kyrgyzstan, he 
generally works confidentially and does not publicly report on his findings.
 
114 The 
High Commissioner has his own early warning network in Kyrgyzstan. One of his 
main instruments is frequent visits to the country and political talks with the 
government and civil society representatives in Bishkek and the provinces. After the 
change of government in 2005, the HCNM had considerable difficulty getting access 
to the government of President Bakiyev on matters of ethnic minorities. On the other 
hand, representatives of the relevant minorities did not have a sufficiently high 
political profile to enter into substantial dialogue with the new government and 
international partners. The High Commissioner promotes minority inclusion and 
integration through projects in fields such as multilingual and multicultural 
education, policing and linguistic policy. Beginning in 2006, he supported an 
Interstate Dialogue on Social Integration and National Minority Education. Along 
with ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, his office has 
participated in elaborating the 2010 Kyrgyz Constitution.115
The HCNM argues for measures of adequate representation and participation of all 
ethnic communities as well as balanced and inclusive education and language 
policies.
  
116
                                                        
112  OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Overview, http://www.osce.org/bishkek/43298. 
 He assisted the presidential administration in drafting a Concept on 
Ethnic Policy and the Consolidation of the Society of the Kyrgyz Republic and Action 
Plan for the Period until 2015. (A competing concept elaborated by the parliament is 
113  OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Report to the Permanent Council by the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, 
Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere, 27 May 2010, PC.FR/7/10/Rev.1, 25 May 2010.  
114  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, 4 May 2010, cited above (Note 102). 
115  Ibid.  
116  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, 15 June 2011, cited above (Note 78). 
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currently in the process of adoption there.) The HCNM encourages the activities of 
the Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan.117
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights continued its advisory, 
capacity-building and monitoring activities predominantly in relation to elections. 
ODIHR led the observation of the constitutional referendum on 27 June 2010, the 
parliamentary elections on 10 October 2010 and the presidential elections on  
30 October 2011. ODIHR also gave legal advice during the constitutional process. It 
provided assistance in reforming the Kyrgyz residency and civil registers in order to 
enhance freedom of movement and facilitate data collection for voter lists.
 (The Assembly’s activities were 
basically disrupted during President Bakiyev’s tenure.) The High Commissioner had 
supported a multiethnic policing project that was integrated later on into the Police 
Reform Programme of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek. The HCNM has a contact person 
permanently seconded to the OSCE Centre in Bishkek.  
118
The OSCE Academy in Bishkek addresses the young generation. It is a visible 
institution that contributes to capacity-building in the country and the region. The 
Academy sees itself as a regional centre of education and a forum for regional 
dialogue and research. Its mission lies, among other things, in providing expert 
training and education in fields such as human rights and conflict management. It 
offers a Master’s course in Politics and Security (Central Asia) and is now opening a 
Master in Economic Governance and Development Programme. It is improving the 
capacities of specialized governmental units such as the state customs service 
through training and conferences. The Academy hosts conferences and seminars in 
different formats. NGO representatives appreciate the Academy as one of the few 
places of intercommunication in Central Asia.
 
Intentions to dispatch ODIHR human rights monitors were met with scepticism by 
Kyrgyz authorities.  
119
7.3. OSCE conflict resolution and mediation in Kyrgyzstan 
 
The matter of conflict resolution and mediation became highly relevant during the 
violence in June 2010. A crucial limitation for all international efforts was caused by 
the strict refusal of enforcement activities by all national sides. During the second 
Kyrgyz crisis, neither the Western states nor Russia and its allies were prepared to 
enforce peace either via UN, EU and NATO or CIS and CSTO. Realistically, with no 
reliable Kyrgyz partners, this would, in any case, have been an effort with no 
reasonable chance of success. The OSCE itself was authorized to conduct 
peacebuilding engagements only as discussed above.  
The Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship played a significant role in resolving the April crisis. 
Holding the OSCE 2010 Chairmanship by fortunate coincidence, Kazakhstan was an 
intermediary in a more natural way than any other participating State from outside 
the region would have been. The Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, 
                                                        
117  Ibid.  
118  OSCE Secretary General, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2010, Vienna, 2011.  
119  OSCE Academy in Bishkek at: http://www.osce-academy.net. 
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Zhanybek Karibzhanov, engaged visibly in co-ordinating international and national 
efforts to settle the April crisis.  
Some observers comment that Kazakhstan mainly acted bilaterally rather than via 
the platform of the OSCE. In any case, it was the most important international player 
in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 and afterwards. It used its Chairmanship to bolster its 
bilateral activities. Kazakhstan’s brokering of Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s official 
resignation and emigration resolved a highly explosive situation in April 2010. In the 
opinion of some, the Kyrgyz events superimposed democratization and human 
rights issues that had also been on the agenda of the Kazakh Chairmanship.  
A controversial issue was Kazakhstan’s unilateral closure of its borders with 
Kyrgyzstan in the course of the April events. It aggravated Kyrgyzstan’s complicated 
economic situation. Rising market prices for gasoline and foodstuff particularly 
burdened ordinary Kyrgyz people. Kyrgyz NGO activists doubt there had ever been 
any danger of a spill-over of tensions across the border that would have justified 
Kazakhstan’s step.  
The Kazakh Chairmanship successfully contributed to gaining control over the first 
Kyrgyz crisis in April 2010, while neither the OSCE as an organization nor any 
significant participating State was willing or able to prevent or intervene in the ethnic 
confrontations during the second Kyrgyz crisis in June 2010.  
The OSCE Centre in Bishkek sees a special success story in the role that local mediators 
– whom it had trained – played in stopping mobs during the June violence. These 
mediators were persons from the communities who had close ties to the local aqsaqals 
– the male elders who are village leaders, wise men and judges at the same time. The 
first training of mediators goes back to 2007.120
Perhaps with the positive Kyrgyz experience in mind, the participating States 
decided at the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting in 2011 to designate the 
aforementioned mediation-support focal point within the CPC. The Secretary 
General was asked to prepare a proposal on improving OSCE conflict mediation 
through strengthening the role of OSCE mediators and a mediation-support capacity 
within the CPC (see annex).
 Through these activities, the Centre 
could also rely on Kyrgyzstan’s very active civil society. Human rights defenders 
play a balancing role as mediators, monitors and informants in general. Many 
Bishkek-based NGOs are well connected with partners in the provinces. The OSCE 
Centre currently supports a public-private network of mediators and civilian 
mediation teams in southern Kyrgyzstan and also provides mediation training in the 
North. Nonetheless, some commentators point out that it is difficult to attribute the 
avoidance of specific acts of violence to these mediators.  
121
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly engaged in the country through the OSCE PA 
Special Envoy to Kyrgyzstan, Adil Akhmetov, who took part in the international 
collective mediation efforts. OSCE parliamentarians met Interim President Roza 
Otunbayeva and conducted a roundtable discussion in Bishkek. OSCE PA Special 
Representative for Central Asia, Kimmo Kiljunen, made regular visits to Kyrgyzstan. 
 
                                                        
120  See also: Makhamadzhan Khamidov, Voices of courage in the eye of the storm: mediators in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, in: OSCE Magazine 2/2011, pp. 14f. 
121  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, cited above (Note 60), pts 9 and 10. 
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As mentioned, he chaired – although rather in a private capacity – the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry until 2011 – politically the topmost international 
reconciliation undertaking in Kyrgyzstan.122
The international co-operation of the OSCE with the EU and the UN worked excellently 
in 2010 and afterwards. These organizations were a prominent presence in the 
country and co-operated through the Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairperson-in-
Office, Zhanybek Karibzhanov, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Envoy, 
Adil Akhmetov, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, and 
the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Jan Kubiš (later Miroslav Jenča). Largely 
positive reference is made to their high-level consultations with Kyrgyz partners, 
joint visits and statements as well as to the regular tripartite co-ordination meetings 
of the OSCE, EU and UN field offices that, especially during the actual months of 
crisis, played an outstanding role in co-ordinating political, humanitarian and other 
aid. Careful reading shows that this co-operation was specifically seen “in the 
aftermath of the April and June 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan”, which brings us back to 
deficits in taking pre-emptive action.
 
123
7.4. OSCE post-conflict reconciliation and rehabilitation in Kyrgyzstan 
  
Post-conflict rehabilitation is also conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan. Roughly a year 
after the June violence, the OSCE diagnosed a stabilized but highly vulnerable 
atmosphere in Kyrgyzstan:  
“While the security situation has largely stabilized and there is a gradual return to some 
semblance of a normal life, many tensions still remain. Those are, however, predominantly 
underlying and dormant. Nevertheless, a small incident has the potential to escalate 
quickly, particularly if fuelled by agitating rumours, inflammatory political rhetoric and/or 
and provocative journalism.”124
The HCNM reported negative tendencies such as nationalist rhetoric mainly in the 
Kyrgyz-language media and at political levels, arbitrary detention, torture, extortion 
and raids on businesses, primarily those belonging to ethnic Uzbeks, as well as 
disproportional prosecution of ethnic Uzbeks.
 
125
OSCE post-conflict rehabilitation in Kyrgyzstan embraces the typical spectrum of 
topics and formats for encouraging OSCE principles and commitments in the 
country and its co-operation within the OSCE framework. There are, in addition, a 
number of activities that acquired particular significance for stabilization and 
reconciliation after the events in 2010. 
  
                                                        
122  OSCE Secretary General, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2010, cited above (Note 118).  
123  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Co-ordination and Co-operation among International Actors in Support 
of the Host Country. Food-for-Thought Paper, SEC.GAL/77/11, 28 April 2011. 
124  OSCE, Mid-term Assessment of the OSCE Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan August – September 
2011, Key Findings and Recommendations, SEC.GAL/154/11, 29 September 2011. 
125  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, 15 June 2011, cited above (Note 78). 
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7.4.1. Post-conflict stabilization through constitutional reform and democratic 
elections 
OSCE assistance in the constitutional process and the legislative and administrative 
preparations of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010 and 2011 has been 
mentioned above as part of conflict prevention activities. Observers emphasize 
positively that the OSCE was patient enough to agree to a slow, but systematic 
preparation of the presidential elections that had originally been scheduled for 2010. 
Supporting activities of the OSCE and other international organizations had a 
mitigating influence. In the end, joint election observation conducted by ODIHR, the 
OSCE PA, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the 
European Parliament (EP) noticeably contributed to legitimizing the election’s 
outcome and thereby Kyrgyzstan’s new political order and leadership. This was 
more so the case as they collectively endorsed progress, but were (surprisingly) clear 
about deficiencies identified in the election process.126
Although the elaboration of the country’s new constitution and its approval by the 
constitutional referendum on 27 June 2010 aggravated political tensions in the first 
instance, it also led to significant and possibly stabilizing changes in the political 
system. Provisions were made to reduce the presidential power and to establish 
parliamentary democracy. The voluntary handover of responsibilities from Interim 
President Roza Otunbayeva to former Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev after the 
presidential elections in 30 October 2011 was a move unique for the country and the 
region. Consequently, the modernization of the constitutional order and the shift of 
political power may have contributed to a more stable political situation in the 
country. Civil society activists comment that there is now a new role for political 
parties in governmental decision-making. “This reform was indigenous. It was 
locally owned.” Some say it is not family clans which now define the political process 
in a straight line, but rather parties that also acquired a say in state governance. 
There could now be a new balance of state powers replacing pure presidential 
authority. Almazbek Atambayev is seen by many as the candidate for Kyrgyz unity. 
The newly established political system will be tested by the next local elections to be 
scheduled for 2012.  
 
7.4.2. Post-conflict rehabilitation through incident investigation 
Immediately after the June violence, the HCNM insisted that “there has to be a 
thorough investigation into what has been happening in the south of the country. 
This will require an independent, international Commission.”127
                                                        
126  The key sentence of the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions reads as follows: “The 
30 October presidential election was conducted in a peaceful manner, but shortcomings underscored 
that the integrity of the electoral process should be improved to consolidate democratic practice in 
line with international commitments.” OSCE ODIHR, OSCE PA, Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, European Parliament, International Election Observation, Kyrgyz Republic – 
Presidential Election, 30 October 2011, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Bishkek, 31 
October 2011. 
 At least ten national 
and international commissions – including a national, a parliamentary, an 
Ombudsman-chaired and a non-governmental commission on the Kyrgyz side and, 
127  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to the 
815th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, HCNM.GAL/4/10/Rev.1, 7 July 2010. 
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most prominently, the aforementioned KIC – contributed to post-conflict fact finding 
and clarification. These were operations outside the OSCE. 
All of the reports caused controversial and heated discussions in the country. After 
the release of the KIC report, the Kyrgyz parliament blocked KIC chair Kimmo 
Kiljunen from entering the country. Kyrgyz human rights activists explain that there 
have long since been “immovable, established truths on the sides of all ethnic and 
political camps” about events such as the June violence. External interference in these 
issues would torpedo the very interests and self-understanding of them.  
7.4.3. OSCE Police Advisory Group and Community Security Initiative 
Following the June events, the OSCE and the new Kyrgyz government saw an urgent 
need to improve police capacities. They had shown substantial deficits in conceptual 
preparation, training and equipment, and all this had combined with the central 
government’s weak authority, the conflicting internal interests of its various factions 
and the local elites during the crisis.  
Insistently encouraged by the OSCE, Interim President Roza Otunbayeva officially 
requested the OSCE to intensify police assistance and dispatch an OSCE Police 
Advisory Group (PAG) to Kyrgyzstan.128 This project expanded the OSCE Centre’s 
engagement in the national Police Reform Programme conducted since 2003.129
The OSCE PAG that was soon replaced by a follow-up effort – the Community 
Security Initiative (CSI) – was a small-scale operation, but of high political 
explosiveness. It had originally been planned as an activity with about  
50 international advisors to co-operate in six teams with local militia patrols in the 
southern provinces of Osh and Jalal-Abad. The project built on positive experiences 
with the OSCE Police Monitoring Group in Croatia (1998-2000) and OSCE police 
advisers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001-2002). The OSCE 
emphasises that it was not meant to act as a peacekeeping force and was not 
designed for law enforcement or investigation. Its mandate embraced the tasks of 
“assist[ing] Kyrgyzstan to reduce inter-ethnic tensions, restore public order and 
strengthen the capacities of the territorial units of the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Kyrgyz Republic”.
 
130
Still in its preparatory phase with only an initial team being in the field in the second 
half of 2010, the PAG project was transferred to the newly launched CSI. It met with 
the same sentiments as the Police Reform Programme assistance and the PAG project 
had earlier. Similar to the PAG, the CSI was planned to be a temporary, small-scale 
operation with only about thirty international experts and roughly the same number 
of locally hired staff. It has been set up to act on three different levels: In the local 
communities it should assist in restoring confidence and encourage a constructive 
  
                                                        
128  See also: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in 
Vienna, OSCE Police Advisory Group to Kyrgyzstan, CIO.GAL/127/10, 17 July 2010. 
129  Activities had included, inter alia, co-operations on police order management, community policing 
and the establishment of two emergency call centres in Bishkek and Osh. For details see: OSCE 
Centre in Bishkek, Policing, at: http://www.osce.org/bishkek/43316. 
130  OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 947, OSCE Police Advisory Group to Kyrgyzstan, PC.DEC/947, 
22 July 2010. For conceptual details see also: OSCE, OSCE Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan: 
Frequently Asked Questions, at: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/71046. 
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police-public partnership. It is understood to address human rights issues in co-
operation with the Kyrgyz law enforcement institutions and to contribute to police 
reform efforts including modern multi-ethnic policing.131
The OSCE PAG and the follow-up CSI were met with great scepticism by large parts 
of the Kyrgyz public and the political classes. Like the aforementioned incident 
investigations, their deployment is still hotly disputed. The very presence of the CSI 
on the sites of the June violence touches upon the society’s most explosive issue and 
is, not least, considered to interfere in the businesses of political and commercial 
elites in the capital and the provinces. NGO activists emphasize that Kyrgyz police 
like other enforcement agencies are commonly seen in ethnic contexts. Some see the 
PAG and CSI projects as being too small to make a difference. 
 In the field, it works 
through instruments such as Neighbourhood Inspectors, Community Safety 
Working Groups (CSWGs) and Mobile Police Reception (MPR).  
Hence, the subject of the PAG and the CSI was strongly instrumentalized for political 
campaigns directed against foreigners’ involvement in the country. In public protests 
and petitions, comparisons were made with OSCE police activities at the Balkans and 
the OSCE’s alleged role in Kosovo’s segregation from Serbia. Kyrgyz analysts make 
the point that the PAG and CSI projects had, thus, scarcely been a home-grown 
activity.  
8. Conclusions from OSCE conflict management in Kyrgyzstan 2010 
1. Sufficient operational capabilities of the Chairmanship. With a view to the Kyrgyz 
events in 2010, observers point out that the Kazakh Chairmanship was 
sufficiently equipped by mandate and available mechanisms to take mediating 
steps in the escalating conflict. Proposals to agree on new standardized 
mechanisms and procedures – such as dispatching Chairmanship assessment 
teams without particular authorization by the Permanent Council – would not 
add up to advancing the Chairmanship’s operational capabilities. Similar steps 
were already covered by the existing guidelines for the activities of the 
Chairmanship (Porto 2002).132
2. Good experience with election-related support. The OSCE has good experience with 
giving help for self-help in the sphere of constitutional reform and elections. 
ODIHR and the High Commissioner provided legal consultancy during the 
constitutional process and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in 
2010. ODIHR led the election observation of the constitutional referendum and 
parliamentary elections in 2010 and the presidential elections in 2011. The 
 Further discussions in that direction may indeed 
lead to over-regulating things and thereby limiting the scope for flexible action. 
By and large, the Chairmanship has sufficient room to take self-reliant decisions 
in crisis situations.  
                                                        
131  Markus Mueller, Report on the status and latest developments regarding the Community Security Initiative 
in Kyrgyzstan by Ambassador Markus Mueller, Head of the Community Security Initiative, to the Permanent 
Council, Thursday, 24 March 2011, PC.FR/4/11, 22 March 2011. 
132  OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No. 8, Role of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office,cited above (Note 
24).  
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peaceful transfer of power through the constitutional process in 2010 and the 
elections in 2011 from Interim President Roza Otunbayeva to Almazbek 
Atambayev were not initiated, but were successfully supported by the OSCE. 
This was an integral part of national and international post-conflict rehabilitation 
efforts. Whether the established parliamentary system will be sustainable 
remains to be seen. 
3. Non-coercive efforts. In some views, early international high-level involvement 
would have been needed in Bishkek and the southern provinces prior to the June 
violence in 2010. This could have mitigated the incidents’ consequences. The 
achievable effectiveness of OSCE conflict management that is confined to non-
coercive efforts is open to discussion.  
OSCE experts emphasize the limited scope for pre-emptive OSCE action given 
the Kyrgyz interim government’s lack of authority over the areas of unrest, the 
immense mobilizing forces of those who triggered the violence and, not least, the 
international key players’ refusal to intervene to enforce peace. Under such 
circumstances, the OSCE was hardly a platform for successful pre-emptive 
action.  
4. Lack of collective will to act. The OSCE has the advantage of established ties with all 
significant governmental and non-governmental players in Kyrgyzstan. The 
modest role it played along with the other international organizations, especially 
after the violence in June 2010, results from the OSCE’s overall declining role in 
European security affairs, its steady depoliticization and the permanent 
reduction of its on-site efforts. The lack of collective will by the participating 
States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in 
managing the conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for 
manoeuvre. 
5. Problems with police assistance. Some eight years of OSCE assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan’s police structures – from supporting the Kyrgyz Police Reform 
Programme to despatching the PAG and the CSI – show mixed results and have 
met with a mixed reception from the Kyrgyz side. Its long-term success appears 
still uncertain as it strongly relies on national partners, many of whom are 
fundamentally opposed to foreign involvement in internal matters. The 
background is political and commercial competition between the northern and 
southern elites of the country in combination with the society’s ethnic divide, bad 
governance, corruption and criminal business. The violent incidents in 2010 have 
created additional barriers. Therefore, in rare clear language, the OSCE 
underlined the dependence of the on-going CSI project on mutual trust and the 
willingness of all Kyrgyz sides involved – from the police and the local 
communities to the central government including the Ministry of Interior – to 
work together.133
6. Disputed assistance to changing elites. The OSCE is now assisting the fourth Kyrgyz 
government in a row – from Askar Akayev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Roza 
Otunbayeva to Almazbek Atambayev. It has played a visible role in the 
stabilization of each of these regimes regardless of how critical it was in 
  
                                                        
133  Markus Mueller, Report on the status and latest developments regarding the Community Security Initiative, 
cited above (Note 131). 
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addressing them. In times of political change or crisis, this is seen retroactively as 
having taken the wrong side. As a matter of fact, the political backup given to the 
new leadership after Askar Akayev’s overthrow in the Tulip Revolution had 
some discrediting effect with Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s quick return to nepotistic, 
authoritarian governance. Local analysts say that some human-rights protectors 
saw themselves abandoned by the OSCE and the international community.  
This matter points to a dilemma the OSCE faces in weak states with competing 
elites where consistent support to state reforms is imperative but, in the long run, 
scarcely possible. 
7. Problems in dealing with past violence. The OSCE’s call to re-establish trust between 
the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan via thorough investigations did not meet with a 
positive response in many Kyrgyz quarters. The foreign involvement in the 
process was met with at least some scepticism. In the view of some observers, the 
many investigations have only created new disputes between the ethnic and 
political camps. At any rate, investigative approaches do, indeed, place emphasis 
on the elements of prosecution and criminal jurisdiction, at least implicitly. Apart 
from the legal imperative of similar investigations, future post-conflict 
appeasement may, therefore, possibly be reached by means of reconciliatory 
reparative justice. It is worth thinking about truth and reconciliation processes 
that could very likely have positive results.  
Beyond this, reconciliation should be achieved predominantly through minority 
participation in public affairs in areas such as the judicial sector, the prosecutorial 
offices, the police, army and the civil service in general. The reactivation of the 
Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan as the place for political minority 
representation in the capital is another case in point. A balanced linguistic policy 
on the promotion of Kyrgyz as the state language, Russian as an official language 
and minority languages in areas of compact settlement is essential. Restoring 
multilingual primary, secondary and high-school education is part of this. Most 
of these issues have been suggested by the HCNM.134
9. Final remarks 
  
The events in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have shown the difficult standing of the OSCE as a 
leading European conflict manager. In places such as Kyrgyzstan, it has lost the 
prominent place it once had in the awareness of the broad public and the 
government. The Organization has deployable institutions, mechanisms, procedures 
and detailed norms, principles and commitments on diverse elements of conflict 
management – both in a narrower and a broader sense. At the same time, the 
participating States carry on with gradually phasing out the Organization’s 
capacities – politically and in operational substance. They are quite divided over how 
to exploit the Organization.  
During the Kyrgyz public uprising in April 2010, the participating States successfully 
applied instruments of short-term, small-scale diplomatic intervention. Then, again 
                                                        
134  OSCE HCNM, Statement by Knut Vollebaek, 4 May 2010, cited above (Note 102). 
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during the violence in June 2010, they exhibited the substantial limitations the 
Organization faces should none of them be willing to take significant large-scale 
action in a weak state with weak political players, competing elites and scarcely 
assessable potentials for conflict.  
At the Vilnius Ministerial Council meeting, the participating States mainly repeated 
appeals to each other to better involve the Organization in managing conflict 
(MC.DEC/3/11). Only a few stipulations, such as giving the Secretary General a more 
prominent function in early warning or making the Conflict Prevention Centre an 
early warning focal point, went beyond this. This does not reduce the necessity of 
taking responsibility – conceptually and in practice – and coming to terms with 
striving for truly collective solutions in Europe’s security issues from global threats 
and challenges to particular conflicts. Otherwise, the already limited options for co-
operative action will continue to decline.  
  
CORE Working Paper 24 | 43 
Annex  
 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe 
Ministerial Council 
Vilnius 
MC.DEC/3/11 
7 December 2011 
Original: ENGLISH 
Second day of the Eighteenth Meeting 
MC(18) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8 
 
DECISION No. 3/11 
ELEMENTS OF THE CONFLICT CYCLE, RELATED TO 
ENHANCING THE OSCE’S CAPABILITIES IN EARLY WARNING, 
EARLY ACTION, DIALOGUE FACILITATION AND MEDIATION 
SUPPORT, AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION 
[Excerpt] 
The Ministerial Council, 
[…] 
1. Decides, in anticipation of further steps in addressing the conflict cycle, to 
strengthen OSCE capabilities in early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation, 
mediation support and post-conflict rehabilitation on an operational level as follows: 
2. Tasks the Secretary General to ensure that the Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention 
Centre (CPC) assumes the role and functions as the focal point for the Organization-
wide systematic collection, collation, analysis and assessment of relevant early 
warning signals from various sources, co-operating and co-ordinating closely with 
other OSCE executive structures and the Parliamentary Assembly; 
3. Urges the OSCE executive structures, within their existing mandates to strengthen 
their exchange of information related to all phases of the conflict cycle and calls for 
enhanced co-ordination between them in this regard; 
4. Tasks the Secretary General, in consultation with the Chairmanship to:  
- Provide early warning to the participating States by bringing to the attention of 
the Permanent Council any situation of emerging tensions or conflicts in the 
OSCE area, complementing the early warning functions already contained in the 
existing mandates of all relevant OSCE executive structures;  
- Suggest to the Permanent Council, after consulting the participating State(s) 
concerned, possible options for timely and effective response(s) to escalating 
tensions or conflicts in the OSCE area;  
- Consolidate, in co-ordination with other executive structures, the OSCE’s early 
warning capacity in a more methodical, comprehensive and cross-dimensional 
manner within available resources;  
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- Prepare a proposal on how to make better use of the possible contributions of the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in developing a more effective response to 
emerging crisis and conflict situations; 
- Prepare a proposal on how to enhance OSCE fact-finding, including expert team 
capabilities during emerging crises and conflicts and present it for consideration 
by the Permanent Council; 
5. Agrees that participating States will share information, as appropriate, with each 
other and the Chairmanship at the earliest opportunity with regard to emerging 
crises or conflicts that threaten security and stability anywhere in the OSCE area;  
6. Urges the Chairmanship to use its mandate to the full extent and to convene the 
Permanent Council without delay, including in special, reinforced or joint FSC-PC 
meeting if necessary, to consider early warning signals and possible response 
options, and in this context encourages the Permanent Council to: 
- Welcome, as appropriate, the participation of the OSCE executive structures 
directly involved as well as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly during 
Permanent Council debates on emerging and ongoing crisis/conflict situations 
which relate to issues that fall within their mandates; 
- Seek closer interaction with the Forum for Security Co-operation that will make 
its own contribution to this work within its competences and mandate; 
- Pursue follow-up to discussions in the Permanent Council on emerging crises 
and conflict situations; 
- Seek input of other international and regional organizations involved as well as 
external advice, as appropriate; 
7. Encourages the Chairmanship to draw on past experience and lessons learned to 
organize thematic meetings devoted to a specific conflict in the OSCE area; 
8. Expects the OSCE Chairmanship and the executive structures to take full 
advantage of their respective mandates to address all phases of the conflict cycle and 
urges the Chairmanship and participating States to use, swiftly and to the greatest 
extent possible, all available tools and procedures as applicable to a particular crisis 
or conflict situation; in this light, tasks the relevant OSCE executive structures, upon 
request by the Chairmanship and/or decision-making bodies, to provide advice on 
the use of existing instruments, mechanisms and procedures and to recommend 
those, as appropriate, to a given crisis or emerging conflict; 
9. Tasks the Secretary General to designate a mediation-support focal point within 
the CPC; 
10. Tasks the Secretary General, in close co-operation and consultation with the 
Chairmanship and executive structures, to prepare a proposal for consideration by 
the Permanent Council on how to maximize the continuity, consistency and 
effectiveness of OSCE engagement in conflict mediation and to strengthen the role of 
OSCE mediators. Among other things, this proposal will aim at developing  
a systematic mediation-support capacity within the CPC covering, inter alia:  
(1) training and capacity-building within the OSCE structures; (2) knowledge 
management and operational guidance; (3) outreach, networking, co-operation and 
co-ordination with relevant local/national actors, as well as with international, 
regional and sub-regional organizations; (4) operational support to Chairmanships, 
their special representatives, heads of field operations, and other relevant OSCE 
mediators; 
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11. Urges the Chairmanship, the participating States and the OSCE executive 
structures to ensure that post-conflict rehabilitation efforts are comprehensive, 
systematic and sustainable, including through the deployment, upon consent of host 
participating State, of expert teams as well as other forms of temporary presence on 
the ground tailored to the specific needs of a given post-conflict situation and based 
on the existing mandates and areas of expertise of relevant executive structures, in 
accordance with relevant decision-making procedures; 
12. Calls on the participating States to develop rosters of national experts readily 
available for OSCE post-conflict rehabilitation efforts as well as for other phases of 
the conflict cycle and to provide those experts with the necessary specialized training 
for them to be rapidly deployable to a crisis or conflict environment;  
13. Urges the participating States, with the assistance of the executive structures, to 
make optimal use of OSCE instruments launched by previous OSCE documents such 
as Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) and tasks the OSCE 
executive structures to collect and analyse lessons identified from the use of such 
instruments in order to develop best practices; 
14. Urges participating States to implement UNSCR 1325 by ensuring increased 
representation of women at all levels in conflict resolution and peace processes, and 
tasks the Secretary General in consultation with the Chairmanship-in-Office to 
prepare a set of concrete recommendations in this regard, and present these for 
consideration by the Permanent Council; 
15. Encourages participating States and, within the framework of their mandate, the 
OSCE executive structures to make greater use of confidence-building and 
confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs and CSBMs), including those 
involving civil society representatives, across the three dimensions of security, in all 
phases of the conflict cycle and as agreed by participating States directly concerned; 
16. Tasks the OSCE executive structures, in accordance with their respective 
mandates and within the framework of relevant decisions of the OSCE decision-
making bodies, to enhance their co-operation and co-ordination with other 
international and regional organizations, especially with their respective structures 
in the field, and with civil society organizations, to increase financial, technical and 
political efficiency and burden-sharing, reduce unnecessary duplication and promote 
the best use of available resources. OSCE executive structures should also develop 
lessons identified and best practices as regards co-operation and co-ordination with 
other international actors in the field;  
17. Calls for increased efforts to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a 
peaceful and negotiated manner, within agreed formats, fully respecting the UN 
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and international law. To that end, calls on the 
Chairmanship and participating States to pursue steps to strengthen OSCE 
capabilities in further addressing the conflict cycle; 
18. Tasks the Secretary General to provide a report by 16 July 2012 as a first step to 
inform participating States on progress made and possible options for the way 
forward in the areas dealt with in this decision, including possible options on how to 
cover, if necessary, related expenses. 
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